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THE POWER TO SUSPEND HABEAS CORPUS: AN 
ANSWER FROM THE ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING 
EX PARTE MERRYMAN 
Jeffrey D. Jacksont 
My lord, I can touch a bell on my right and order the imprisonment 
of a citizen in Ohio; I can touch a bell again and order the arrest of 
a citizen of New York; and no power on earth except that of the 
President can release them. Can the Queen of England do so much? 
--William H. Sewardl 
We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's 
citizens. 
--Hamdi v. RumsfelrF 
INTRODUCTION 
The question of which political branch has the power to suspend 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a classic constitutional 
separation of powers question with important consequences for civil 
liberties. This "Great Writ of Liberty" that allows courts to inquire 
into the legality of a citizen's detention by government forces has 
been recognized as an important weapon against tyranny. 3 The Con-
stitution's Suspension Clause provides that, "The Privilege of the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."4 While this 
language appears to allow for the suspension of the privilege of the 
writ in dire emergency, it does not answer a critical question: Which 
branch of the government has the power to suspend? The only case 
to squarely address the issue, Ex parte Merryman,5 is often presented as 
a conflict of personal wills, rather than as a correct legal analysis of the 
t Visiting Assistant Professor, Washburn University School of Law. The 
author wishes to thank T. Alex Aleinikoff and Doug Lind for their helpful 
comments, suggestions, and guidance in the preparation of this article. 
1. Statement allegedly made by William H. Seward, President Abraham Lin-
coln's Secretary of State, to Lord Lyons, British Minister to America. AR. 
THUR M. SCHLESINGER,jR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 58-59 (1973). 
2. 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004). 
3. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, fIABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF 
LIBERTY 1, 9 (2001). 
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
5. 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
11 
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Suspension Clause.6 The basic facts surrounding Merryman are well-
known: the arrest of John Merryman for suspected rebel activity in the 
opening days of the Civil War, United States Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Roger Brooke Taney's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus de-
manding either an explanation of his confinement or his release, and 
President Lincoln's refusal to obey the writ. 
Cursory examinations of the case give the impression that the con-
flict was simply one of wills: Taney's Southern sympathies against Lin-
coln's determination to save the Union by any means necessary.7 
History tends to credit Taney with the correct legal conclusion, while 
crediting Lincoln with making the correct pragmatic one.s Under 
this traditional assessment, it would seem to matter little whether the 
President has the power under the Constitution to suspend the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus; instead, it matters only that the Pres-
ident believes he or she has the power to do so if necessary.9 
This assessment is too simplistic, and the lesson that it teaches is 
misleading. It is questionable whether Lincoln's suspension of habeas 
corpus in the spring and summer of 1861 was necessary, or even con-
tributed, to the safety of the Union.IO Further, Taney's opinion stands 
as the legal word on the subject largely because it was never appealed, 
not because it is necessarily persuasive. 11 The question of which 
branch of government has the power under the Constitution to sus-
pend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains unanswered.12 
Instead, the power to suspend habeas corpus has resided in what Jus-
tice RobertJackson referred to as the "zone of twilight": an area where 
the distribution of power between Congress and the President is 
uncertain. 13 
6. See, e.g., CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN 
CHIEF 25-26 (1951). 
7. See id. at 25. 
8. See, e.g., id. at 24-25. 
9. [d. Rossiter is skeptical that this distinction matters. See infra note 297 and 
accompanying text. 
10. See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 8 (1991) (noting that the worst of the danger of invasion of 
Washington, D.C. had passed by the time Lincoln first authorized the sus-
pension of habeas corpus). 
11. In fact, a fair number of influential legal scholars at the time criticized the 
opinion. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist more recently noted that Taney's original determination that 
the President had no power to suspend habeas corpus was rendered with-
out the benefit of argument by counsel on the subject. See WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAws BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 40-41 
(1998). 
12. A number of cases have addressed the Suspension Clause in some detail. 
Not one, however, has definitively passed on the question, although they 
are of value in answering it. See infra notes 122-200 and accompanying text. 
13. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jack-
son, j., concurring). Jackson stated that, within this zone, "congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical 
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The answer to the question is of vital importance in this post-9 III 
era. The current "War on Terror" has already raised numerous legal 
issues regarding the power of the President as commander-in-chief to 
detain without trial suspected terrorists, including American citizens, 
or to subject them to military tribunals. 14 Further, it appears that the 
initial draft of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, submitted by the Department of 
Justice, included a proposal to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for 
an undefined period. 15 Given the importance of the writ and the un-
charted legal territory in which the country finds itself, the question of 
the authority to suspend the writ should not be left in a grey area. If 
the constitutional rights of American citizens are to be protected, an 
answer to this question is essential. 
This article examines the question of which branch has the power 
to suspend the writ. It analyzes Ex parte Merryman and the legal argu-
ments concerning the suspension power put forth by the most promi-
nent legal scholars at the time of that case. 16 
The use of these particular arguments provides several advantages. 
First, Ex parte Merryman provides the prime example of a separation of 
powers conflict with regard to the power to suspend. That is, it in-
volves a President claiming the inherent power to suspend habeas 
corpus, without even the tacit approval of Congress, and thus directly 
addresses the issue. This is a rarity in our legal history, as more recent 
Presidential actions with regard to civil liberties have come with at 
least some support of Congress.17 Second, because Merryman is the 
only case to directly address the issue of the power to suspend habeas 
corpus, and was such an important case in its time, the legal argu-
ments surrounding the case provide the most comprehensive discus-
sion of the power to suspend habeas corpus that exists. Further, these 
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential respon-
sibility." Id. 
14. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 
124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). In these three 
cases, the United States Supreme Court delivered a sharp check on the 
President's assertion of unilateral power to declare persons as "enemy com-
batants" and to hold them without access to the legal system. See infra notes 
151-75 and accompanying text. 
15. See STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: How AMERICA CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 
73-74 (2003). Brill obtained this information from interviews with Repre-
sentative James Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, as well as White House officials who stated that they saw the draft. 
Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that he "could not 'reconstruct with 
any accuracy' whether the suspension of habeas corpus was proposed." Id. 
at 74. Brill relates that, after Sensenbrenner told Ashcroft the suspension 
of habeas corpus was a "nonstarter," the provision was deleted from the 
official proposal of the bill. Id. 
16. See infra Parts I-III. 
17. See REHNQUIST, supra note 11, at 219 (noting the differences between the 
executive branch's conduct in the Civil War and that during the twentieth 
century). 
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arguments were made at a time much closer to that of the Framers 
than our own, and thus provide a perhaps keener insight into the 
original intent of the Framers regarding the power to suspend habeas 
corpus. 
Part I of the article is devoted to examining the facts surrounding 
Ex parte Merryman, as well as responses to the opinion. Part II provides 
an analysis of the Constitution in an effort to determine which branch 
of government possesses the power to suspend the privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus. Part III discusses whether, even if, as Taney be-
lieved, Congress is the branch with the power to suspend, the Presi-
dent still has a concurrent power to suspend in certain circumstances. 
Part IV then examines the relevance of the answer today. 
I. THE FACTUAL SITUATION OF EX PARTE MERRYMAN 
In order to examine Ex parte Merryman in the proper context, one 
must understand the situation Lincoln faced in April and May of 
1861. Fort Sumter fell on April 14.18 On April 17 and 18, Virginia's 
convention adopted an ordinance of secession, and the state militia 
seized the federal armory at Harper's Ferry and Gosport Navy Yard. 19 
Maryland was also unfriendly to Lincoln, and it appeared that it might 
secede as well, leaving Washington, D.C. surrounded by hostile 
territory. 20 
The precarious situation in Maryland got worse on April 19, when 
the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment entered Baltimore on its way to re-
inforce Washington.21 As the troops marched between railway sta-
tions, they were attacked by an angry mob.22 The resulting altercation 
left four soldiers and twelve civilians dead, with many others 
wounded.23 In response to the riot, Baltimore's mayor and the chief 
18. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CWIL WAR ERA 273-74 
(1988). 
19. Id. at 278-79. Virginia's secession ordinance was finally ratified on May 23, 
1861. Id. at 280. 
20. See id. at 284-85; NEELY, supra note 10, at 4. In the 1860 election, Lincoln 
received only 2,000 of the approximately 93,000 votes cast in Maryland for 
president. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITES 
STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 1074, 1080 (1975). Democratic candidate 
Stephen Douglas received approximately 6,000 votes, while Southern-
Rights Democratic candidate john C. Breckenridge of Kentucky, and Con-
stitutional Unionist candidate john Bell of Tennessee, each received ap-
proximately 42,000 votes. Id. McPherson notes that, while northern and 
western Maryland were unionist, southern and eastern Maryland were se-
cessionist, and the legislature was controlled by Southern-Rights Demo-
crats. MCPHERSON, supra note 18, at 285. 
21. MCPHERSON, supra note 18, at 285. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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of police ordered the destruction of railroad bridges into the city from 
Pennsylvania.24 
In the midst of this frenzied activity was a man named John Mer-
ryman. Merryman was a wealthy landowner, the president of the Ma-
ryland Agricultural Society, and an officer in the state militia.25 An 
ardent secessionist, Merryman was known for speaking vigorously 
against the Union, and had recruited a company of soldiers with the 
intent to join the Confederate Army.26 Merryman participated in the 
burning of bridges and tearing down of telegraph wires in response to 
the Baltimore riot. 27 
On April 26, Governor Hicks called a special session of the Mary-
land legislature into session.28 This gathering, and the fear that the 
legislature would soon pass an ordinance of secession, caused Lincoln 
to first consider the idea of suspending habeas corpus.29 General-in-
Chief Winfield Scott urged Lincoln to arrest secessionist-minded legis-
lators to prevent the legislature from passing a secession ordinance, 
but Lincoln decided against it.30 Lincoln wrote to Scott, however, that 
if the legislature decided on secession and armed conflict with the 
Union he was "to adopt the most prompt and efficient means to 
counteract, even, if necessary, to the bombardment of their cities, 
and, in the extremest necessity, the suspension of the writ of habeas 
CorpUS."31 Fortunately for Lincoln, the Maryland legislature ultimately 
refused to consider an ordinance of secession.32 
24. Id. See also NEELY, supra note 10, at 5 (explaining that Baltimore officials 
justified the burning of the bridges as resulting from fear that other Union 
troops would enter the city and take revenge for the riot, but pointing out 
that it also had the effect of cutting Washington off from the rest of the 
Union). 
25. See WALKER LEWIS, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: A BIOGRAPIN OF CHIEF JUSTICE 
ROGER BROOKE TANEY 447 (1965); MCPHERSON, supra note 18, at 287. 
26. Sherrill Halbert, The Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus try President Lin-
coln, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 99 (1958). 
27. See MCPHERSON, supra note 18, at 287. 
28. NEELY, supra note 10, at 6. 
29. Id. at 6-7. 
30. Id. 
31. 6 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 255-56 (John G. Nicolay & John 
Hay eds., n.p. 1894). Some commentators have cited this letter as proof of 
the reluctance with which Lincoln looked on the suspension of habeas 
corpus, in that he considered it a step to be taken only in the "extremest 
necessity" and more drastic than ordering the bombardment of cities. See, 
e.g.,J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 121 (1963). 
However, as Neely notes, such an assertion probably gives too much credit 
to Lincoln's commitment to civil liberties. See NEELY, supra note 10, at 7. In 
the original copy of the letter, Lincoln wrote, "if necessary, to the bombard-
ment of their cities-and of course the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus." Id. However, Lincoln disliked the casual use of the phrase "of 
course," and struck it out, inserting "in the extremest necessity" instead. Id. 
32. MCPHERSON, supra note 18, at 287. Instead, the legislature adopted a "neu-
tral position," although the lower house did denounce "the war which 'the 
Federal Government had declared on the Confederate States.'" Id. 
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The situation in Washington improved somewhat with the arrival of 
additional troops after April 24.33 However, Lincoln and General 
Scott remained worried about the safety of the capital. 34 As a result, 
on April 27, Lincoln wrote the following order for General Scott: 
You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against 
the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the 
vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be 
used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Wash-
ington you find resistance which renders it necessary to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you 
personally, or through the officer in command at the point 
at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that 
writ.35 
On May 25, at approximately 2 a.m., soldiers acting under the order 
of General William H. Keirn arrested Merryman at his home outside 
Baltimore on suspicion of drilling troops in order to take them south 
to join the Confederacy, aiding and abetting the burning of railroads 
and bridges in order to prevent troops from reaching Washington, 
and obstructing the United States mail.36 Merryman was imprisoned 
in Fort McHenry.37 Surprisingly, however, he was allowed contact 
with his family attorney.38 Later that day, Merryman's attorney went 







See id. at 286. The Seventh New York regiment entered Washington on 
April 25, after repairing the rail line from Annapolis. Id. Other regiments 
soon followed. Id. 
See NEELY, supra note 10, at 8. General Winfield Scott drafted an order on 
April 26 warning that "numerous hostile bodies of troops" had assembled 
near the city, and that "an attack upon it may be expected at any moment." 
Letter from Winfield Scott to Abraham Lincoln (Apr. 26, 1861) (on file 
with the Library of Congress), available at http://memory.loc.gov/am-
mem/alhtml/malhome.html. See also NEELY, supra note 10, at 8. 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 31, at 258. Neely points 
out that this order was actually a second draft, with the first order authoriz-
ing suspension only in the vicinity of the railway line from Philadelphia to 
Washington through Annapolis. NEELY, supra note 10, at 8. 
Sydney G. Fisher, The Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the Rebel-
lion, 3 POLl. SCI. Q. 454,456 (1888). Fisher got the information regarding 
the charges directly from Merryman's attorney, George M. Gill. Id. at 456 
n.1. See also BERNARD C. STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY 491 (1922) 
(noting that Taney later stated that "Merryman appeared to have been 'ar-
rested upon general charges of treason and rebellion' without giving the 
names of the witnesses"); Mark E. Neely, Jr. et aI., The Impeachment Trial of 
President Abraham Lincoln, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 351, 359 (1998) (describing testi-
mony given during Lincoln's impeachment trial regarding the reasons for 
Merryman's arrest). 
STEINER, supra note 36, at 491. 
See id. See also HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF 
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 82 (1975). Hy-
man conjectures that this allowance was due to Merryman's status in society 
and the novelty of the process at that point. Id. 
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refused to show him the paper under which Merryman was kept in 
custody. 39 
Merryman's attorney then went to Washington', where he presented 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus to Chief Justice Taney in chambers 
at the Supreme Court.40 The next day, Sunday, Taney issued a writ 
directing that Merryman be brought before him in Baltimore on Mon-
day.41 On Monday, General Cadwalader sent a representative to the 





STEINER, supra note 36, at 491. There is some question as to whether the 
soldiers arresting Merryman actually got the right person. Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch 
Interpretation, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 81, 97-98 (1993). The order General 
Keirn sent apparently authorized the arrest of a captain of a secessionist 
company in Maryland, rather than Lieutenant Merryman. Id. 
HYMAN, supra note 38, at 82-83. Merryman's attorney apparently went to 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court because a major at Fort McHenry 
had already disregarded DistrictJudge William F. Giles' order in a previous 
case involving a minor who had enlisted without the consent of his parents. 
See ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 21; 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE Su-
PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, 843 
(1972). Furthermore, Merryman's father and Taney had attended Dickin-
son College at the same time. Id. at 845. 
STEINER, supra note 36, at 491. The fact that Taney made the writ returna-
ble in Baltimore, id., along with the fact that Ex parte Merryman was pub-
lished in the circuit court reporter, RANDALL, supra note 31, at 131, has led 
to the general assumption that he issued the writ in his capacity as a circuit 
court judge. See MCPHERSON, supra note 18, at 287-88; William H. Rehn-
quist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War, in 6 GAUER DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN 
LAw AND PUBLIC POLICY 12 (1997); Halbert, supra note 26, at 99. It was 
customary at the time for one of the Supreme Court Justices to also sit as 
the presiding judge in each term of the circuit court in his circuit. STEINER, 
supra note 36, at 451. Taney had been sitting with the Circuit Court of the 
United States for the District of Maryland in Baltimore since April 8, 1836. 
Id. However, it is not at all clear that this characterization of Taney acting 
as a circuit court judge is correct. See ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 20 (arguing 
that Taney acted as Chief Justice of the United States throughout the pro-
ceedings). The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was addressed to Ta-
ney in his capacity as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and was 
presented to him in chambers in Washington. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. 
Cas. 144, 147 (e.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). Furthermore, at the hearing 
regarding the return of the writ, Taney announced that he was sitting as 
"Chief Justice of the United States." See David L. Martin, When Lincoln Sus-
pended Habeas Corpus, 60 AB.A.]. 99, 100 (1974); see also HYMAN, supra note 
38, at 83 (" [Taney] issued a writ at once, taking care first to strike the desig-
nation of himself as a circuit jurist from the petition."). Walker Lewis, in 
his biography of Taney, states that Taney considered issuing the writ return-
able in Washington, but felt that the situation could better be handled in 
Baltimore. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 450-51. In his opinion in Merryman, 
Taney stated that he chose to bring the matter to Baltimore so as not to 
withdraw General Cadwalader from the limits of his military command. 17 
F. Cas at 147. Under the 1789 Judiciary Act, Supreme Court Justices, as well 
as other federal judges, had original jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas 
corpus for prisoners held under the authority of the United States. SeeJudi-
ciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82. 
SWISHER, supra note 40, at 845. 
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stating that the President had authorized him to suspend the writ of 
habeas cOrpUS.43 He asked Taney to postpone further action until 
Cadwalader had the opportunity to confer with Lincoln on the 
matte r. 44 
Taney denied Cadwalader's request and immediately issued a writ 
of attachment for contempt against Cadwalader, directing him to ap-
pear on Tuesday.45 On Tuesday, however, the marshal who had been 
directed to serve the attachment reported that he had been denied 
entry into Fort McHenry.46 Taney commented that, although he 
could have ordered the marshal to summon a posse comitatus to deliver 
the attachment, it would have been futile due to the overwhelming 
force at Fort McHenryY He promised instead to file a written opin-
ion that would be given to Lincoln "so that that high Officer may per-
form his Constitutional duty of seeing that the laws are enforced. "48 
On Friday, June 1, Taney filed his opinion in Ex parte Merryman. 49 
Taney began by noting his surprise that Lincoln could believe the 
President had the power to declare a suspension of habeas corpus, 
and could delegate such power to a military officer. 50 Taney stated 
that he had "supposed it to be one of those points of constitutional 
law upon which there was no difference of opinion, and that it was 
admitted on all hands, that the privilege of the writ could not be sus-
pended, except by act of congress."51 Taney noted that the clause 
prohibiting the suspension of habeas corpus, except in cases of rebel-
lion or invasion when the public safety may require it, was found 
among the, enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, rather than 
the Article II powers of the President.52 He then observed that, even 
if Congress were to authorize a suspension of the writ, a party impris-
oned by regular judicial process could not be detained in prison or 
tried by military tribunal because the Constitution guaranteed the 
right to a speedy and public tria1.53 Taney rejected the idea that the 
President had any independent powers under the constitutional provi-
sion giving him the duty to "take care that the laws shall be faithfully 
executed"; rather, he stated that the President's duty to do so was 
subordinate to judicial power.54 
43. See Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147. Cadwalader was under order to decline to 
produce prisoners in response to writs of habeas corpus, no matter by what 
authority issued. RANDALL, supra note 31, at 161. 
44. SWISHER, supra note 40, at 846. 
45. STEINER, supra note 36, at 492. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 492-93. 
48. [d. at 493-94 n.8. 
49. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 452. 
50 . .ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
51. [d. 
52. [d. at 148-49. 
53. [d. at 149 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
54. [d. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
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In further support of his position that the President had no power 
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, Taney cited English law, which 
granted the power to suspend habeas corpus to Parliament, while de-
nying it to the Crown.55 He also cited Justice Story's Commentaries on 
the Constitution, which assumed that Congress was the proper branch 
to suspend habeas corpus, 56 as well as the statement of Chief Justice 
Marshall in Ex parte Bollman:57 "If at any time, the public safety should 
require [the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus], it is for the 
legislature to say SO."58 
Taney further chastised the military authorities for not only sus-
pending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but also for having 
"by force of arms, thrust aside the judicial authorities and officers to 
whom the constitution has confided the power and duty of interpret-
ing and administering the laws, and substitut[ing] a military govern-
ment in its place, to be administered and executed by military 
officers."59 He concluded by stating: 
In such a case, my duty was too plain to be mistaken. I 
have exercised all the power which the constitution and laws 
confer upon me, but that power has been resisted by a force 
too strong for me to overcome. It is possible that the officer 
who has incurred this grave responsibility may have misun-
derstood his instructions, and exceeded the authority in-
tended to be given him; I shall, therefore, order all the 
proceedings in this case, with my opinion, to be filed and 
recorded in the circuit court of the United States for the dis-
trict of Maryland, and direct the clerk to transmit a copy, 
under seal, to the president of the United States. It will then 
remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his constitu-
tional obligation to 'take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted,' to determine what measures he will take to cause the 
civil process of the United States to be respected and 
enforced.60 
55. [d. at 150-51. In summation of this recitation, Taney stated: 
If the president of the United States may suspend the writ, then the 
constitution of the United States has conferred upon him a more 
regal and absolute power over the liberty of the citizen, than the 
people of England have thought it safe to entrust to the crown; a 
power which the queen of England cannot exercise at this day, and 
which could not have been lawfully exercised by the sovereign even 
in the reign of Charles the First. 
[d. at 151. 
56. [d. at 151-52. 
57. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
58. Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 152 (quoting 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) 
(dictum)). 
59. [d. 
60. [d. at 153. 
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Taney's opinion was widely published throughout both the Union 
and the Confederacy.61 Results were predictable, with the northern 
Democratic press labeling Lincoln a "despot," and the Republican 
press denouncing the opinion as one that was only to be expected 
from the pro-slavery justice who had authored Dred Scott.62 
Upon being informed of Taney'S opinion, Lincoln directed his at-
torney general, Edward Bates, to consult with noted Unionist lawyer 
Reverdy Johnson in order to present an argument for his power to 
suspend habeas corpus.63 In the meantime, on July 4, 1861, Lincoln 
himself addressed the Merryman case in his message to the special ses-
sion of Congress.64 In his message, Lincoln stated: 
Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty 
to authorize the commanding general, in proper cases, ac-
cording to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, 
without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, 
such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public 
safety.65 
He further asserted that "[t]his authority has purposely been exer-
cised but very sparingly."66 
Addressing Taney'S criticism that the person charged with the duty 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed not break them, Lin-
coln stated that "some consideration was given to the questions of 
power, and propriety, before this matter was acted upon."67 He then 
noted that the Confederacy was resisting "the whole of the laws," and 
61. See NEELY, supra note 10, at 10; SWISHER, supra note 40, at 850. 
62. See NEELY, supra note 10, at 10; SWISHER, supra note 40, at 850-51. Swisher 
quotes a Baltimore Sun article which stated that: 
Long after this terrible conflict shall have been brought to an 
end ... [the] influence of this document from the mind of Roger 
B. Taney will live, at once a vindication of the principles of the 
republic, and of the fundamental rights of the people, and an over-
whelming protest against the action of those who have so rudely 
assailed them. 
Id. at 851. Swisher also quotes an article by the New York Tribune, which 
stated: "No Judge whose heart was loyal to the Constitution would have 
given such aid and comfort to public enemies." Id. Taney was also the 
author of the controversial opinion in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
393 (1856), in which the Supreme Court declared that Dred Scott, a slave, 
was not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 405-06. 
63. NEELY, supra note 10, at 10-11. Reverdy Johnson, a Maryland lawyer, had 
represented the defense in the Dred Scott case and served as President Tay-
lor's attorney general. 10 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 112-13 (Du-
mas Malone ed., 1933). Bernard Steiner referred to Johnson as "the 
leading American lawyer" of his time. BERNARD STEINER, LIFE OF REVERDY 
JOHNSON iii (1914) [hereinafter STEINER, LIFE OF JOHNSON]. 
64. MCPHERSON, supra note 18, at 288. 
65. U.S. Senate Journal, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., July 4, 1861, 12-13. 
66. Id. at 13. 
67. Id. 
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asked, "are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government 
itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"68 
However, Lincoln went on to make it clear that he did not feel that 
his suspension violated the Constitution.69 He stated that the Consti-
tution explicitly permits the suspension of the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus when, in case of rebellion, the public safety requires 
it.70 He then noted that the Constitution was silent as to who may 
suspend the privilege, and, because suspension is intended only in 
cases of emergency, "it cannot be believed the framers of the instru-
ment intended that, in every case, the danger should run its course, 
until Congress could be called together; the very assembling of which 
might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion."71 
Finally, Lincoln asserted that Attorney General Bates would offer a 
more extended argument for his position, and, in the meantime, Con-
gress was free to pass legislation on the subject. 72 
Bates's written opinion, although presented to Lincoln the next 
day, was not given to Congress until July 12.73 In this opinion, Bates 
argued that the Constitution was vague as to which branch should ex-
ercise the power to suspend, and, as the head of a coordinate and co-
equal branch, the President had the power to interpret the Constitu-
tion and was not bound by the judicial branch's interpretation.74 He 
argued that the President had a "peculiar duty" above the other 
branches to preserve the Constitution and execute the laws, and that 
this duty required the President to use whatever means he deemed 
necessary to put down the rebellion.75 Bates also contended that the 
rebellion was purely political in nature, and that courts had no power 















NEELY, supra note 10, at 14. The House of Representatives passed a resolu-
tion on that date that requested the opinion. Id. 
See generally lOOp. Att'y Gen. 74 (1861), reprinted in Rehnquist, supra note 
41, at 51-65. Professor Paulsen notes that Bates's argument with regard to 
what he terms "autonomous executive branch interpretation" is in some 
ways a continuation of the position taken by Lincoln in his opposition to 
the Dred Scott opinion. Paulsen, supra note 39, at 88. As a Senate candidate 
in 1858, Lincoln stated that he opposed the Dred Scott decision as a political 
rule. Id. (citing Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Sixth Joint Debate with Ste-
phen A. Douglas (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LIN-
COLN 255 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953». At his inaugural, Lincoln went 
farther, stating that "if the policy of the government ... is to be irrevocably 
fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, ... the people will have ceased to 
be their own rulers .... " Paulsen, supra note 39, at 88 (quoting Abraham 
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in 4 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953». 
Rehnquist, supra note 41, at 57. 
Id. at 60. 
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Bates's opinion was not to be the last word on the subject. Legal 
scholars rushed to enter the fray on both sides of the issue.77 The 
contributors to this debate included some of the finest legal minds of 
the period. 78 
77. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 149 
(1980); see also HORACE BINNEY, THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (Philadelphia, C. Sherman & Son, 2d ed. 
1862); ROBERT L. BRECK, THE HABEAS CORPUS AND MARTIAL LAw (Cincin-
nati, Richard H. Collins 1862); DAVID BOYER BROWN, REPLY TO HORACE BIN-
NEY ON THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION (Philadelphia, james Challen & Son 1862); ].C. BULLITT, A 
REVIEW OF MR. BINNEY'S PAMPHLET ON "THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION" (Philadelphia, john Campbell 1862); C.H. 
GROSS, A REPLY TO HORACE BINNEY'S PAMPHLET ON THE HABEAS CORPUS 
(n.p. 1862); CHARLES INGERSOLL, AN UNDELIVERED SPEECH ON EXECUTIVE 
ARRESTS (n.p. 1862); TATLOW JACKSON, AUTHORITIES CITED ANTAGONISTIC 
TO HORACE BINNEY'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Phila-
delphia,john Campbell 1862);jAMES F.jOHNSTON, THE SUSPENDING POWER 
AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Philadelphia, john Campbell 1862); 
STEINER, LIFE OF JOHNSON, supra note 63, 51-52 (detailing noted Unionist 
lawyer Reverdy johnson's defense of Lincoln's position ); WILLIAM KEN-
NEDY, THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (n.p. 1862); JOHN T. MONTGOMERY, THE WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND MR. BINNEY (Philadelphia, john Campbell, 2d ed. 
1862); ISAAC MYER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER PERSONAL LIBERTY: A REVIEW 
OF HORACE BINNEY'S ESSAY ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (n.p. 1862); S.S. 
NICHOLAS, HABEAS CORPUS: A RESPONSE TO MR. BINNEY (Louisville, Bradley 
& Gilbert 1862);jOEL PARKER, HABEAS CORPUS AND MARTIAL LAw: A REVIEW 
OF THE OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY, IN THE CASE OF JOHN MERRYMAN 
(Cambridge, Welch, Bigelow, & Company 1861); EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE GREAT 
REBELLION 1860-1865 162 (Da Capo Press, 2d ed. 1972) (1864) (citing an 
article in the Boston Daily Advertisfff on june 5, 1861 that summarized a lec-
ture by Theophilus Parsons); G. M. WHARTON, REMARKS ON MR. BINNEY'S 
TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Philadelphia, john Campbell, 
2d ed. 1862). Binney,johnson, Kennedy, and Parsons were generally of the 
opinion that the President could suspend the writ, or at least was not re-
quired to obey a writ that was issued. BINNEY, supra, at 40, 58; STEINER, LIFE 
OF JOHNSON, supra note 55, at 51-52; KENNEDY, supra, at 14; MCPHERSON, 
supra, at 162. Breck, Brown, Bullitt, Gross, Ingersoll, jackson, johnston, 
Montgomery, Myer, Nicholas, and Wharton were of the opinion that the 
President alone was without power to suspend the writ. BRECK, supra, at 37-
39; BROWN, supra, at 30-31; BULLITT, supra, at 53; GROSS, supra, at 37, 40; 
INGERSOLL, supra, at 5; JACKSON, supra, at 2, 8; JOHNSTON, supra, at 47-48; 
MONTGOMERY, supra, at 23-26; MYER, supra, at 94; NICHOLAS, supra, at 20; 
WHATRON, supra, at 17. . 
78. For example, Philadelphia lawyer Horace Binney was acknowledged as one 
of the best lawyers in the country, and was the author of the six-volume 
Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 2 DICTIONARY 
OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 280 (Allen johnson ed., 1929). The credentials of 
Reverdy johnson have been set forth at supra note 63. joel Parker and The-
ophilus Parsons were distinguished professors at Harvard Law School. 14 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 230,273 (Dumas Malone ed., 1934). 
judge Samuel Smith Nicholas of Kentucky was a prominent Democratic 
Party theoretician, a states' rights activist, and the author of a treatise on 
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Ultimately, the legal question of whether Lincoln's suspension of 
habeas corpus was constitutional remained unresolved. Rather than 
appeal the Merryman decision and risk the chance of loss, Lincoln de-
cided that the best course of action was simply to ignore the issue.79 
The other members of the Supreme Court were also content to let the 
matter go unexamined, a stance which would become a pattern dur-
ing the war.80 John Merryman had been released from confinement 
on July 12, the same day that Bates's opinion justifying Lincoln's sus-
pension reached Congress.81 He was indicted for treason, but was 
never prosecuted.82 
Although Lincoln had put the propriety of his suspension of the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the 37th Congress in the 
emergency session of 1861, Congress debated the matter without tak-
ing any action.83 The second wartime session of Congress convened 
on December 2, 1861, and Congress again took no action.84 A third 
session convened on December 1, 1862, and finally, on March 3,1863, 
Congress passed legislation authorizing Lincoln to suspend the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas cOrpUS.85 As a result of Lincoln's suspension 
martial law. See HYMAN, supra note 38, at 143; S.S. NICHOLAS, MARTIAL LAw 
23 (1842). 
79. See RANDALL, supra note 31, at 132; supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
The administration was afraid to put its theories of presidential power to 
the test, for fear of an adverse ruling in the courts. See id. 
80. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 65 (Sanford Lev-
ison ed., 3d ed. 2000). McCloskey notes that the Court as a whole was not 
willing to challenge Presidential action in wartime, finding reasons to de-
cline jurisdiction on issues that might provoke a conflict. See id. See also 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 130 (1993) (noting 
that, during Lincoln's assault on civil rights, "the Court remained in the 
state of recession which its Dred Scott decision had induced"). 
81. See LEWIS, supra note 25, at 453. Merryman was transferred to civil authori-
ties and then released on $40,000.00 bail. SWISHER, supra note 40, at 853. 
82. LEWIS, supra note 25, at 453. According to Lewis, Chief Justice Taney was 
largely responsible for the fact that Merryman and approximately sixty 
others held on similar charges in Maryland were not prosecuted. [d. Taney 
was concerned that those being held would not get a fair trial, and so in-
structed District Judge Giles not to try their cases by himself. [d. Because 
Taney was the only other federal district judge designated to sit at Balti-
more, this meant that none of the trials could occur in his absence. [d. For 
over a year, Taney's ill health made it impossible for him to sit with the 
circuit court. Id. John Merryman went on to become State Treasurer of 
Maryland from 1870-72. See ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND (BIOGRAPHICAL SERIES) 
MSA SC 3520-1543, available at http://www.mdarchives.state.md.us/msa/ 
speccol!sc3500/sc3520/001500/001543/html!msaOI543.html. 
83. See CONGo GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1861); Halbert, supra note 30, at 
111. 
84. [d. at 111-12. 
85. [d. at 112-13. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 stated that "during the pre-
sent rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever, in his judg-
ment, the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United 
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of habeas corpus, thousands of American citizens were arrested and 
held in prison.86 
As can be seen above, the factual situation presented in Ex parte 
Merryman provided an exceptionally clear opportunity for the various 
arguments regarding the power to suspend habeas corpus. This re-
sulted in the most comprehensive legal analysis of the question in 
American history.87 The arguments raised by the various supporters 
and detractors of both Taney's and Lincoln's positions still pertain 
today, and serve as a useful road map in an analysis of the question. 
II. THE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE POWER TO SUSPEND THE 
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Prior to analyzing the question of who has the constitutional power 
to suspend habeas corpus, it is helpful to precisely define what such 
suspension entails. The general consensus, even prior to the Civil 
War, was that suspension did not mean that habeas corpus itself was 
suspended, but rather that the privilege guarded by the writ was sus-
pended.88 The Supreme Court later confirmed this belief in Ex parte 
Milligan,89 wherein it stated: "The suspension of the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as 
a matter of course; and on the return made to it the court decides 
whether the party applying is denied the right of proceeding any fur-
ther with it."90 
Also, the fact that the privilege of the writ was suspended did not 
serve to immunize the official from later liability for an illegal arrest.91 
Thus, while a person who had been illegally arrested and detained 
while the suspension was in place was precluded from procuring his 







States, or any part thereof." The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, ch. 81, 13 
Stat. 755. 
See NEELY, supra note 10, at 113-15. Neely points out that the number of 
persons arrested is difficult to determine. See id. The American Annual 
Cyclopedia and Register of Impmtant Events of the Year 1865 put the figure at 
38,000. NEELY, supra note 10, at 113. Neely notes that the ~enerally ac-
cepted number among historians is 13,353, a number complIed in 1897 
from a file search performed by Colonel F.C. Ainsworth, Chief of the Re-
cord and Pension Office of the War Department, at the behest of historian 
James Ford Rhodes. Id. at 115. Neely also provides an in-depth analysis of 
the different figures used by historians, as well as the problems inherent in 
attempting to obtain a precise count of arrests. Id. at 113-38. He ultimately 
contends that, while it is clear that there were more than 13,353 citizens 
arrested, the significance for civil liberties was small, since many of those 
arrested were in fact citizens of the Confederacy. Id. at 137-38. 
See supra notes 77-78. 
See WILUAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 42 
(Gaunt Inc. 1997) (1863). 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
Id. at 130-31. 
See CHURCH, supra note 88, at 42-43. 
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rester.92 In recognition of this fact, the English legal tradition was for 
the suspension of the writ to be followed by the passage of a law in-
demnifYing the government officials who acted during the suspen-
sion.93 The United States government followed this tradition in 
passing the Indemnity Act of 1863, which stated that an order of the 
President should be considered a defense to any civil or criminal 
claim against a government official for illegal arrest or 
imprisonment.94 
With these principles in mind, the analysis now turns to the argu-
ments presented regarding Lincoln's power to suspend the privilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus. 
A. Bates's Argument for the President's Power to Interpret the Constitution 
Attorney General Bates provided the first defense of President Lin-
coln's suspension of habeas corpus, arguing that the President has the 
power to interpret the Constitution and is not bound by the judicial 
branch's interpretation.95 According to Bates, the President is the 
head of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government, and as 
such cannot be made subordinate to the rulings of another branch.96 
Bates's argument raises an interesting point. If his argument is cor-
rect, then it does not matter what Justice Taney, or we today, believe is 
the correct interpretation of the Constitution with regard to the 
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Instead, 
it matters only what the President believes is the correct 
interpretation. 
It must be admitted that this argument runs counter to what we 
generally think of as the power of the courts to be the final arbiters of 
the Constitution. The general consensus today is that the President is 
subordinate to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.97 However, the idea that the executive branch has independent 
power to interpret the Constitution in a different manner than, and 
even in opposition of, the judicial branch has at least some historical 
basis in the writings of James Madison.98 In The Federalist No. 49, 
Madison denied that a frequent reference to constitutional conven-
tions would be able to keep the different branches within their respec-
tive bounds, and suggested that a coordinacy existed among the three 
branches such that "neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an 
92. See id. 
93. See id. at 385. 
94. Indemnity Act of 1863, ch. 81, § 4, 12 Stat. 756. Randall notes that, in spite 
of this Act, there were as many as three thousand suits pending against 
federal officials by September of 1865, as parties sought to exploit loop-
holes in the Act. RANDALL, supra note 31, at 193-94. 
95. See Rehnquist, supra note 41, at 52-53. 
96. Id. 
97. See Paulsen, supra note 39, at 82. 
98. See id. at 84-85. 
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exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their 
respective powers."99 In his writings, Madison advanced the idea that 
the tension between the branches and the Constitution's system of 
checks and balances would help to keep each branch within its 
boundaries. 100 
Whatever Madison or the other Framers might have believed, the 
issue of branch coordinacy in interpreting the Constitution was settled 
in Marbury v. Madison,IOI with Chief Justice Marshall's statement that 
"[iJ t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.''102 A close reading of Marbury, however, casts 
doubt on this assertion. Marshall's statement in Marbury was made in 
the context of declaring that an act of the legislature interpreting the 
Constitution could not bind the courts because courts have a duty to 
interpret the Constitution for themselves. l03 Marbury suggests noth-
ing about whether this interpretation would be binding on other 
branches of government or state governments. 104 
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). See Paulsen, supra note 39, at 84-85 (noting Madison's idea of 
branch coordinacy). 
100. Paulsen, supra note 39, at 85. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James 
Madison). 
101. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
102. See id. at 177. The Supreme Court has often espoused this view. See United 
Sdttes v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1973) (reaffirming that, while each 
branch must initially interpret the Constitution in the performance of its 
duties, Marbury established that the judiciary is vested with the ultimate 
power to interpret the Constitution); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 
549 (1969) (stating that "[o]ur system of government requires that federal 
courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with 
the construction given the document by another branch"); Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (stating that: 
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by 
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the 
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been commit-
ted, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and 
is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the 
Constitution) ; 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that Marbury "declared the 
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the 
law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by 
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of 
our constitutional system"). This view has been especially prevalent in deci-
sions by the Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598,616 n.7 (2000)(stating that "[n]o doubt the political branches have a 
role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury 
this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text"). 
For a discussion of the Rehnquist Court's views on constitutional interpreta-
tion, see generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Tenn Foreword: 
We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2001). 
103. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78. 
104. See Thomas W. Merrill, judicial opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations 
for judgments, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 43, 51 (1993); William W. Van Alstyne, A 
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE LJ. 1,37 (1969). 
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Nonetheless, the idea of judicial superiority in the interpretation of 
the Constitution had gained general acceptance in American legal cir-
cles by the time of Merryman. 105 For example, in his Commentaries on 
the Constitution, Justice Story stated that, with regard to the constitu-
tionality of legislation: 
The decision then made, whether in favour, or against the 
constitutionality of the act, by the state, or by the national 
authority, by the legislature, or by the executive, being capa-
ble, in its own nature, of being brought to the test of the 
constitution, is subject to judicial revision. It is in such cases, 
as we conceive, that there is a final and common arbiter pro-
vided by the constitution itself, to whose decisions all others 
are subordinate; and that arbiter is the supreme judicial au-
thority of the courts of the Union.106 
In the end, Bates's argument is simply a diversion in our search for 
the correct interpretation of the power to suspend habeas corpus be-
cause it is not an argument of interpretation at all, but rather an argu-
ment about the interpreter.107 The idea of autonomous executive 
branch interpretation of the Constitution was not persuasive even by 
the time of Merryman. lOS Given the Rehnquist Court's views on the 
supremacy of the Court in interpreting the Constitution, that idea is 
even less tenable today.109 Nevertheless, it ultimately does not add to 
our understanding of what the Constitution provides on the subject. 
B. The Question of Which Branch Has the Power to Suspend the Writ 
Bates had little to say about what the language of the Constitution 
actually provides regarding the suspension of habeas corpusYo In-







See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 347 (Cambridge, Brown, Shattuck, & Co. 1833). 
Id. 
See generally HYMAN, supra note 38, at 92. 
See id. at 89-92 (noting that even Bates admitted that "the weight of prece-
dent" favored Congress, not the President, suspending the privilege). 
See supra note 102. Any question as to whether the Court would be willing 
to defer completely to the President during war time was definitively an-
swered in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, wherein the majority opinion stated that 
"[ w] hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Execu-
tive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in 
times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches 
when individual liberties are at stake." 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004) (plural-
ity opinion). 
See Rehnquist, supra note 41. With regard to the Constitution's language 
concerning the writ, Bates remarked that "[v]ery learned persons have dif-
fered widely about the meaning of this short sentence, and I am by no 
means confident that I fully understand it myself." Id. at 61. Bates did 
briefly address the habeas corpus provision in the Constitution, albeit in a 
vague and confusing way, to argue that the provision itself was vague and 
confusing. Id. at 18-22. 
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interpretation of the Constitution came from noted Philadelphia law-
yer Horace Binney.l11 Binney's general argument was that: (1) while 
the Constitution provides for the repeal of the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus, it does not say which branch is to exercise that power; 
therefore (2) it is necessary to determine which branch, under the 
structure of the Constitution, is the proper one to wield the power; 
and (3) because the action provided for by the Constitution is the 
repeal of the privilege of the writ rather than the writ itself, the proper 
branch is the President, given the nature of his duties as executiveY2 
According to Binney, if the power was to repeal the writ itself, the 
matter would clearly be legislative, but because the power was merely 
to repeal the privilege of the writ, no legislation was necessary, and the 
matter was simply executiveY3 
Binney's argument was heavily criticized by other legal theorists of 
the time. l14 They argued instead that precedential and persuasive le-
gal authorities, combined with the position of the habeas corpus 
clause in the Constitution, the traditional exercise of the writ in En-
glish law, the actions of the Framers during the Constitutional Con-
vention, and remarks made during the state ratification conventions, 
all compelled the conclusion that the power to suspend the privilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus was exclusive to Congress.115 
The first step in determining which of these positions is correct is to 
examine the Suspension Clause itself, which states: "The Privilege of 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."1l6 
This simple statement raises several questions that are important to its 
interpretation. First, the Clause is restrictive in tone, in that it prohib-
its the suspension of the writ except in two circumstances, rebellion 
and invasion, and even then only when public safety requires it.117 It 
does not explain, however, which person or branch is to exercise the 
authority to suspend the writ under those circumstancesYs Further, 
it is unclear whether the Clause itself gives the power to suspend the 








See generally BINNEY, supra note 77; HORACE BINNEY, THE PRIVILEGE OF THE 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, SECOND PART (1862). 
See BINNEY, supra note 77, at 4-6. 
Id. at 37. 
See BRECK, supra note 77; BULLITT, supra note 77; GROSS, supra note 77;JACK-
SON, supra note 77; JOHNSTON, supra note 77; MONTGOMERY, supra note 77; 
MYER, supra note 77; NICHOLAS, supra note 77; WHARTON, supra note 77. 
See BULLITT, supra note 77, at 22; GROSS, supra note 77; JACKSON, supra 
note 77 at 2; JOHNsTON, supra note 77, at 48; MONTGOMERY, supra note 77, 
at 14; NICHOLOAS, supra note 77; WHARTON, supra note 77, at 19. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 2. 
Id. 
118. See id. 
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simply a restriction on the power to suspend the writ, and the power 
to do so is granted in another place.1l9 
Because the plain language of the Suspension Clause is of little help 
in clarifYing the issue, the next step is to examine the legal authorities 
construing the Clause. With regard to case law, there are several Su-
preme Court opinions, although none conclusive, that have bearing 
on the Suspension Clause. I20 Of these cases, the most important in 
determining what the Framers intended are those which are tempo-
rally close to the framing, and can thus be inferred to more closely 
mirror the Framers' intentions.121 
In his Merryman opinion, Taney expressed a belief that the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Ex parte BollmanI22 clearly established that Congress 
is the only branch entitled to suspend the writ.123 Bollman was one of 
the cases arising out of the Aaron Burr conspiracy, and concerned the 
power of the Supreme Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the 
release of two alleged conspirators being held in federal custody.124 
The petitioners, Dr. Erich Bollman and Samuel Swarthout, minor 
players in the conspiracy, were imprisoned in Washington, D.C. by 
military authorities. 125 They petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ 
of habeas corpus securing their release. I26 
In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall found that the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 empowered the Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas 











If at any time the public safety should require the suspension 
of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United 
States, it is for the legislature to say so. 
That question depends on political considerations, on 
which the legislature is to decide. Until the legislative will be 
expressed, this court can only see its duty, and must obey the 
laws. 128 
See id. 
See infra notes 122-200 and accompanying text. 
This inference becomes less likely as the time between the case and the 
Framing increases. Thus, more contemporary cases are of limited value in 
discerning the original intent of the Framers. 
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 75-76. In 1805, Aaron Burr, former Vice President of 
the United States, hatched a secessionist scheme that would have created a 
new country in the American Southwest. See DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: 
JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE REpUBLIC 218-19 (1949). The 
plan never really got off the ground, although it raised trouble between the 
United States and Spain, which controlled Mexico. See id. at 221-23. 
See Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 75; LOTH, supra note 124, at 223. 
Swarthout and Bollman were involved in the passing of letters from Burr 
about the conspiracy. Id. at 221. 
Id. at 223. 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 96-100. 
Id. at 101. 
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. Marshall's statement in Bollman has been seized upon by some as 
support for the theory that the power to suspend is given only to Con-
gress. 129 A question exists, however, as to how much import to give 
Marshall's statement. First, as Horace Binney recognized, it was 
clearly dicta because it was not necessary to reach Marshall's holding 
that the Court had jurisdiction to issue the writ. 130 Further, the issue 
in Bollman was the Supreme Court's authority to issue the writ under 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authority was granted by Congress, 
not the Constitution. 131 It is undisputed that Congress could suspend 
the jurisdiction that it granted the Supreme Court under the Judiciary 
Act. 132 
In his book, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus, William F. 
Duker argues that Bollman is authoritative because, whatever the ques-
tion presented, the thesis of Marshall's opinion assumed that the 
habeas clause imposed an obligation on Congress to pass some means 
of empowering federal courts with habeas jurisdiction.133 Thus, ac-
cording to Duker, because Congress was the only body empowered to 
pass legislation granting habeas jurisdiction, only Congress could sus-
pend the writ. 134 
129. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2665 (2004) (Scalia, j., 
dissenting). 
130. See BINNEY, supra note 77, at 38-39; see also RANDALL, supra note 31, at 133; 
Halbert, supra note 26, at 109. Even some of those commentators who 
agreed with Taney's result grudgingly admitted that Marshall's statement 
might have been dictum. See BULLITT, supra note 77, at 20-23; MONTGOM-
ERY, supra note 77, at 14; WHARTON, supra note 77, at 19. However, they 
were of the mind that, if the statement was dictum, it was at least highly 
persuasive dictum. See, e.g., BULLITT, supra note 77, at 20 (stating: "It is 
worthy of consideration whether even an 'obiter' of Chief Justice Marshall 
upon such a question would not be good authority. He spoke neither 
lightly nor loosely. A review of the case will show that he could not have 
spoken without reflection."); MONTGOMERY, supra note 77, at 14 (stating 
that "[i]f [Marshall's statement] is an obiter dictum, it has as few of the 
infirmities of a question collateral to the point in controversy, as any to be 
found in the books"). 
131. Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 75. The only constitutional question 
presented was whether Congress could grant the Court power to issue a 
writ of habeas corpus under its power to control the appellate jurisdiction 
of the courts. See id. at 100-01. 
132. See RANDALL, supra note 31, at 133-34; Halbert, supra note 26, at 109. Bates 
picked up on this point in his legal opinion, stating: 
I take it for certain that in the common course of legislation, Con-
gress has power, at any time, to repeal the judiciary act of 1789 and 
the act of 1833, (which grants to the courts and to the judges the 
power to issue the writs) without waiting for a rebellion or inva-
sion .... The Court does not speak of suspending the privilege of 
the writ, but of suspending the powers vested in the court by the act. 
Rehnquist, supra note 41, at 62-63. 
133. DUKER, supra note 77, at 172 n.126. 
134. Id. 
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It is true that Marshall began his opinion in Bollman by noting that 
"the power to award the writ [of habeas corpus] by any of the courts of 
the United States, must be given by written law."135 He also noted 
that, in passing the Judiciary Act, Congress must have been acting 
under the influence of the habeas corpus clause and that "they must 
have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient 
means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life 
and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself 
would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be en-
acted."136 These comments, however, do not compel the conclusion 
that Marshall believed Congress had the power to suspend the writ 
and the President did not. At most, they provide an inference that 
Marshall believed Congress could have prevented federal courts from 
issuing the writ by failing to give them the authority to do so. This 
does not answer the question of whether Congress could, without run-
ning afoul of the Suspension Clause, take away the power of the fed-
eral courts to issue writs once they had been given that power. 
Perhaps more importantly, Marshall's comments do not touch on 
the ability of Congress or the President to suspend the rights of a state 
court to issue a writ of habeas corpus. AlthoughJustice Taney and the 
Supreme Court had earlier held in Ableman v. Booth137 that state 
courts did not have the power to issue habeas corpus petitions for 
federal prisoners,138 that decision was contrary to the generally ac-
cepted rule that state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over their 
citizens held under federal process.139 Given the historical under-
standing that state courts could grant writs of habeas corpus for fed-
eral prisoners, it seems odd to argue that the power of suspension 
found in the Constitution was simply the power of Congress to take 
away the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus, yet 
135. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 94. 
136. Id. at 95. 
137. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). 
138. Id. at 523. 
139. See ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND 
ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT: 
WITH A VIEW OF THE LAw OF EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVES 156 (Albany, W.C. 
Little & Co. 1876) (stating that "[ilt may be considered that state courts 
may grant the writ in all cases of illegal confinement under the authority of 
the United States"); see also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAV-
ERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 187 (1975) (asserting that concurrent juris-
diction was the settled view). In fact, Taney's opinion in Ableman, which 
prevented state courts from issuing writs for runaway slaves under federal 
custody, was so reviled and provoked so much contention that the issue of 
jurisdiction was not finally settled until after the war. Id. In Tarble's Case, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871), the Supreme Court conclusively held that state 
courts could not issue writs for federal prisoners. Id. at 411-12. See also 
COVER, supra, at 187. 
32 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
leave state court power to do so untouched. 140 As a result, Bollman 
cannot be considered conclusive on the question of who may suspend 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under the Constitution.141 
Some legal historians have incorrectly assumed that the question 
surrounding the Suspension Clause was answered in Taney's favor by 
the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan.142 However, 
Milligan did not address the President's unilateral suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus, but addressed whether a civilian who was not in 
the theater of military operations could be tried by a military tribu-
naU43 At the time of Milligan's arrest, Congress had given the Presi-
dent the ability to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1863.144 Milligan did not address the power to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus, although Justice David Davis, writing for the 
majority, did note that" [iJ t is essential to the safety of every govern-
ment that, in a great crisis, like the one we have just passed through, 
there should be a power somewhere of suspending the writ of habeas 
cOrpUS."145 
The one issue from Merryman that Milligan did address was whether 
a citizen could be tried by a military tribunal in areas where the courts 
were actually open and functioning. 146 In Merryman, Chief Justice Ta-
ney had stated that, even if properly held in custody, Merryman could 
not be tried by a military tribunal.147 The Supreme Court in Milligan 
came to the same conclusion. 148 Only in this sense can Milligan be 











See BULLITT, supra note 77, at 10 (stating that, if this were the case, "the 
power of suspension granted to Congress being limited to the Writs issued 
or to be issued by the Federal courts, and having no application to the State 
courts, the attempt to suspend the privilege could and probably would be 
rendered nugatory by the action of the latter"). 
See supra notes 122-36. 
71 u.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See, e.g., MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE BLESSINGS 
OF LIBERTI': A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U NITEO 
STATES 190 (1996) (stating that, in Milligan, "all the justices ... agreed that 
Lincoln's suspension of the writ [of habeas corpus] had been unconstitu-
tional; the Constitution gave that power only to Congress"). 
Milligan, 71 u.S. (4 Wall.) at 108-09. 
See 12 Stat. 755, ch. 81, § 1; Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 115 (addressing 
the President's invocation of the power to suspend granted by this Act). 
See 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 125. 
See id. at 127-30. 
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 130. 
This part of the Milligan decision was later distinguished, and arguably 
modified, by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Qui-
rin concerned the trial by military tribunal of German saboteurs who were 
captured in the United States during World War II. Id. at 20-23. One of 
the saboteurs, Hans Haupt, argued that he could not be tried by a military 
tribunal because he was an American citizen, having lived as a child in the 
United States with his German parents, who were naturalized American citi-
zens. Id. at 20. The Court distinguished Milligan, noting that Milligan had 
not been associated with the armed forces of the enemy, while Haupt pre-
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More recently, the Supreme Court decided a trio of cases concern-
ing the detention of "enemy combatants," which cast new light on the 
debate regarding the powers of Congress and the President. I5o Of 
these three decisions, one in particular, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, has consid-
erable implications for our analysis of the Suspension Clause. I51 
In Hamdi, the question at issue was whether the Executive has the 
authority to detain American citizens who qualify on the grounds that 
they are "enemy combatants."I52 The petitioner, Yaser Asim Hamdi, 
was born in Louisiana, but moved to Saudi Arabia with his parents. I53 
During the fighting in Mghanistan in 2001, he was captured by the 
United States's Northern Alliance allies, and eventually turned over to 
the United States military.I54 Through his father, he filed a habeas 
corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, arguing that his detention was unlawful. I55 In other 
documents filed with the court, Hamdi asserted that he was not an 
"enemy combatant," but a relief worker trapped in Mghanistan once 
the fighting began. I56 
In response to this assertion, the Government filed a declaration 
from Michael Mobbs, which identified Mobbs as "Special Advisor to 
sumably was associated with the German armed forces. Id. at 45-46. Ac-
cordingly, the Court authorized the saboteurs to be tried by military 
commission. Id. at 48. 
150. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (plurality opinion); Rum-
sfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 
(2004). 
151. 124 S. Ct. 2633. The other two cases, Padilla and Rasul, are both important, 
but their holdings were limited ones based on jurisdiction. Padilla con-
cerned a question akin to that in Merryman: whether an American citizen 
not captured on the battlefield, but detained on suspicion of aiding the 
enemy, could be held indefinitely as an "enemy combatant." See 124 S. Ct. 
at 2715. The Court did not reach this issue, however, because Padilla's 
habeas petition had been filed in the wrong jurisdiction and named the 
wrong respondent. Id. at 2721-22, 2727. Rasul concerned the question of 
whether the federal habeas statute conferred the right to judicial review 
over the legality of executive detention of aliens in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
a territory over which the United States does not exercise "ultimate sover-
eignty." 124 S. Ct. at 2693. The Court held that it did. Id. at 2699. While 
these cases do not directly bear on the suspension power question, they do 
provide insight into the Court's stance regarding the importance of habeas 
corpus. Rasul in particular reaffirms that"' [a] t its historical core, the writ 
of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Execu-
tive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been 
strongest.'" 124 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 
(2001». 
152. 124 S. Ct. at 2639. 
153. Id. at 2635. 
154. Id. at 2635-36. Hamdi was initially detained in Afghanistan and then trans-
ferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Upon learning that he was an American 
citizen, the Government transferred him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, and then a brig in Charleston, South Carolina. Id. at 2636. 
155. Id. 
156. See id. 
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the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy."157 In his declaration, 
Mobbs stated that he was familiar with the circumstances surrounding 
Hamdi's capture, that Hamdi had been "affiliated with a Taliban mili-
tary unit" during a time in which the Taliban were engaged in fighting 
with the Northern Alliance, and that Hamdi had surrendered both 
himself and a weapon to the Northern Alliance. I58 
Although the district court ordered that Hamdi be given access to 
counsel and "meaningful judicial review" of the legality of his deten-
tion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
versed. I59 In so doing, the Fourth Circuit stated that detention of 
enemy combatants served the "vital purposes" of preventing enemy 
combatants from rejoining the enemy, and of relieving "the burden 
on military commanders of litigating the circumstances of a capture 
halfway around the globe."I60 The Fourth Circuit held that these in-
terests were "directly derived from the war powers of Articles I and II" 
and that the judiciary was "not at liberty to eviscerate" these 
interests. 161 
The Fourth Circuit also held that, to the extent that Hamdi's deten-
tion required congressional approval, Congress had given it in the 
post-gill Authorization for Use of Military Force, which "authorized 
the President 'to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.' "162 Accordingly, the 
Fourth Circuit determined that the district court's attempted vigorous 
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Hamdi's capture "went far 
beyond the acceptable scope of review" and that "[a]ny effort to ascer-
tain the facts concerning the petitioner's conduct while amongst the 
nation's enemies would entail an unacceptable risk of obstructing war 
efforts authorized by Congress and undertaken by the executive 
157. Id. at 2636-37. 
158. Id. at 2637. 
159. Id. at 2637-38. The district court initially appointed counsel and ordered 
that counsel be given access to Hamdi. Id. at 2637. The Fourth Circuit 
reversed that order on the grounds that the district court had failed to con-
duct a "deferential inquiry into Hamdi's status." See id. at 2636. On re-
mand, and following the Government's filing of Mobbs's declaration, the 
district court ordered the Government to produce numerous materials for 
in camera review. See id. at 2637. The Government sought to appeal the 
production order, and the district court certified the question to the 
Fourth Circuit of whether Mobbs's declaration was "sufficient as a matter of 
law to allow for meaningful judicial review .... " Id. at 2638. The Fourth 
Circuit then reversed the holding of the district court without squarely an-
swering the certified question. Id. 
160. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 460, 465 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 
2633 (2004). 
161. [d. at 466. 
162. Id. at 467. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 
U5 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. 12001». 
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branch."163 The Fourth Circuit therefore ordered the petition 
dismissed. 164 
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opmIOn authored by Justice 
O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ken-
nedy and Breyer, vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision. 165 Although 
agreeing with the Government that the congressional Authorization 
for Use of Military Force "clearly and unmistakably authorized" 
Hamdi's detention, the plurality stated that "there remains the ques-
tion of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes 
his enemy-combatant statuS.,,166 In answering this question, the plu-
rality made a number of sweeping statements regarding the impor-
tance of due process and the writ of habeas cOrpUS.167 For example, 
the plurality first noted that" [a]ll [parties] agree that, absent suspen-
sion, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual 
detained within the United States."168 Importantly, for our purposes, 
the plurality then went on to state that "[o]nly in the rarest of circum-
stances has Congress seen fit to suspend the writ" and that "[a] t all 
other times, it has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensur-
ing that it does not detain individuals except in accordance with 
law."169 
The plurality emphatically rejected the argument that Hamdi's sta-
tus as an enemy combatant could be established merely by the Gov-
ernment's declaration that it is so; however, the plurality also 
determined that a full-blown factual review as envisioned by the dis-
trict court was inappropriate.170 The plurality held, rather, that "a citi-
zen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classifica-
tion, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual asser-
tions before a neutral decisionmaker."171 It concluded that the 
process need not be accompanied by the "full protections" that would 
apply in other settings, but could be streamlined to include the use of 
hearsay evidence or a burden-shifting scheme that included a rebutta-
ble presumption in favor of the Government's evidence. 172 
Finally, the plurality explicitly rejected the idea that the doctrine of 
separation of powers gave courts only a limited role. 173 The plurality 
163. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 472-73, 474-75 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
164. Id. at 477. 
165. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652. 
166. Id. at 2641, 2643. 
167. See id. at 2646-52. 
168. Id. at 2644. 
169. Id. (emphasis added). 
170. Id. at 2644-48. 
171. Id. at 2648. 
172. Id. at 2649-50. 
173. Id. at 2650. 
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stated that "[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions 
for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for 
all three branches when individual liberties are at stake."174 The plu-
rality then stated that "[it has] made clear that, unless Congress acts to 
suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch 
to playa necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of govern-
ance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive's discre-
tion in the realm of detentions."175 
In dissenting from the plurality's decision that Congress had au-
thorized Hamdi's detention, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, 
also stressed the historical importance of due process and the writ of 
habeas corpus, as well as the role of the Suspension Clause. 176 Noting 
that "[t]he very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of 
separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at 
the will of the Executive," and that such freedom has been historically 
secured by the right to habeas corpus, he opined that "Hamdi is enti-
tled to ... release unless (1) criminal proceedings are promptly 
brought, or (2) Congress has suspended the writ of habeas corpus."177 
In support of his opinion, Scalia first engaged in an analysis of 
habeas corpus in English common law and its influence on the Fram-
ers. 178 He concluded that, at the time of the framing, it was under-
stood that a right of due process protected against arbitrary 
imprisonment, and a writ of habeas corpus historically "vindicated" 
this right. 179 He contended that this general understanding influ-
enced both the Due Process Clause and the Suspension Clause.180 
Justice Scalia conceded that the allegations against Hamdi were "no 
ordinary accusations of criminal activity," but instead were allegations 
against a citizen who had been imprisoned for aiding the enemy in 
wartime. 181 However, he denied that this distinction made any differ-
ence where the rights of a citizen, as opposed to an alien combatant, 
were at issue.182 He noted that while captured enemy aliens have tra-
ditionally been treated as prisoners of war subject to release at war's 
end, American citizens aiding the enemy have been treated as traitors 
who are subject to the criminal process. 183 
174. [d. 
175. [d. (emphasis added). 
176. [d. at 2661-73 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
177. [d. at 2661,2671 (emphasis added). 
178. [d. at 266l. 
179. [d. at 2662. 
180. [d. at 266l. 
181. [d. at 2663. 
182. [d. 
183. [d. Justice Scalia noted that the only citizen other than Hamdi imprisoned 
in connection with military hostilities in Mghanistan, John Walker Lindh, 
had been subjected to the criminal process for violation of the anti-terror-
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Scalia also conceded that there may be times in which "military exi-
gency renders resort to the traditional criminal process impractica-
ble," but argued that these are the times for which the Suspension 
Clause was designed. 184 He characterized the Suspension Clause as a 
"safety valve," and noted its various usages throughout history.18S 
More important for our purposes, he stated that "[a]lthough [the Sus-
pension Clause] does not state that suspension must be effected by, or 
authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so understood, consistent 
with English practice and the Clause's placement in Article 1."186 
Scalia then went on to examine whether the government's only 
choices under the Constitution for dealing with citizens accused of 
aiding the enemy were suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or 
criminal prosecution.187 Again, an examination of historical sources 
led him to conclude that they were. 188 He examined first the text of 
the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which provided a remedy for 
those imprisoned for the offense of "High Treason."189 Under the 
Act, those committed were to be released if they were not indicted 
and tried within a prescribed time. 190 Scalia also quoted from a letter 
of Thomas Jefferson, the House of Representatives debates regarding 
Jefferson's proposed suspension of the writ during Burr's conspiracy, 
three cases decided during the War of 1812, and the Court's decision 
in Ex parte Milligan. 191 Scalia deduced from these authorities that 
" [t] he proposition that the Executive lacks indefinite wartime deten-
ism laws. See id. at 2664 (citing United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 
(E.D. Va. 2002». 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 2665. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 2666-70. 
188. See id. at 2671-72. 
189. Id. at 2666. 
190. Id. 
19l. Id. at 2666-67. Scalia noted that, in a letter written to James Madison, Jef-
ferson questioned the need to suspend habeas corpus in times of rebellion, 
since the parties involved could be arrested and charged with a crime. Id. 
at 2666. In the House debate Scalia referenced, Representative Burwell ar-
gued that the suspension of the writ was unnecessary because the perpetra-
tors could be charged with a crime and kept in prison prior to trial. Id. at 
2666-67. In the first of the cases cited by Scalia, In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813), a citizen taken into military custody on suspicion of 
aiding the enemy was ordered released by a New York court. Hamdi, 124 S. 
Ct. at 2667. In the two other cases, Smith v. Shaw, 12Johns. 257 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1815), and M'Connell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815), 
courts upheld verdicts for false imprisonment against military officers who 
detained American citizens. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2667. With regard to Mil-
ligan, Scalia argued that, while the Court later purported to limit Milligan's 
application in Ex parte Quirin, such a limitation "cannot undermine its value 
as an indicator of original meaning." Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2668 n.l. See also 
supra note 149 (discussing Quirin's impact on Milligan). 
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tion authority over citizens is consistent with the Founders' general 
mistrust of military power permanently at the Executive's disposal."192 
Scalia stated that, because suspension or submission to the criminal 
process are the only acceptable alternatives, the plurality's argument 
that Hamdi's detention was justified under the congressional Authori-
zation for Use of Military Force was an "evisceration" of the Suspen-
sion Clause. 193 He further decried the plurality's approach as an 
attempt to make up for the failure of Congress to suspend the writ.194 
He concluded that the Constitution provided a clear choice to either 
suspend the writ or follow traditional criminal process, and stated that 
"[b]ecause the Court has proceeded to meet the current emergency 
in a manner the Constitution does not envision, I respectfully 
dissent."195 
Of what importance is the Court's decision in Hamdi to the exami-
nation of which branch has the power to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus? In one respect, the Hamdi decision is of immense impor-
tance, in that it provides insight on the current views of the Court with 
regard to the power to suspend. Although the references to Con-
gress's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the plurality opinion 
are clearly dicta, they at least raise an inference that the four members 
of the plurality would place the power to suspend squarely within the 
province of Congress. 196 Justice Scalia's unequivocal statement in dis-
sent, that the power to suspend belongs to Congress, places him and 
Justice Stevens firmly in the camp of those who believe the power to 
suspend belongs to Congress. 197 Thus, if the question were presented 
today, a substantial majority of the Court would find that Congress has 
the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and that the Presi-
dent lacks the power to do so. 
Hamdi is of lesser value, however, on the actual legal question of 
which branch of government has the power to suspend. For all of its 
references to Congress holding the power to suspend the writ, the 
plurality provides no support for its statements. 198 While Justice 
Scalia's dissent does cite a few authorities, including Merryman, those 
192. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2668. In pressing this point, Scalia noted that "[n]o 
fewer than 1 0 issues of the Federalist were devoted in whole or part to allay-
ing fears of oppression from the proposed Constitution's authorization of 
standing armies in peacetime." [d. 
193. [d. at 2671-72. 
194. [d. at 2673. Scalia referred to the plurality'S decision as coming from a "Mr. 
Fix-it Mentality" and a mission to "Make Everything Come Out Right." [d. 
195. Id. at 2671, 2674. 
196. See id. at 2644, 2650. These statements are dicta because, as the plurality 
explicitly notes, "All [of the parties] agree suspension of the writ has not 
occurred here." [d. at 2644. 
197. See id. at 2665. 
198. See id. at 2644, 2650. 
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authorities do not themselves compel the conclusion that the Suspen-
sion Clause places the suspension power with Congress. 199 
Ultimately, while the Hamdi decision provides valuable insight as to 
what the current Court might conclude is the final answer to the Sus-
pension Clause question, it provides little insight into how the Court 
might reach that decision, and little justification for the conclusion. 
This should not be construed as a criticism of the Hamdi opinion; 
clearly, the question of suspension was not at issue in the case, and the 
Court's attention was not focused on the question.200 However, it 
does mean that we must look elsewhere in our inquiry into which 
branch has the power to suspend. 
One such place may be in early American legal treatises. As with 
case law, treatises from the late 1700s and early to mid 1800s lend 
insight into what the Framers believed the general state of the law to 
be, and, by inference, what they intended.201 One prominent treatise, 
cited by Taney in the Merryman opinion,202 wasJustice Story's Commen-
taries on the Constitution.203 In discussing the suspension of habeas 
corpus, Story remarked: 
Hitherto no suspension of the writ has ever been authorized 
by congress since the establishment of the constitution. It 
would seem, as the power is given to congress to suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion, that 
the right to judge, whether exigency had arisen, must exclu-
sively belong to that body. 204 
Unfortunately, Story provided no authority from which he derived the 
opinion that the power to suspend habeas corpus is given to Congress. 
The persuasive value of his opinion is, therefore, limited.205 
199. See id. at 2665. As discussed above, Bollman concerns the authority of Con-
gress under the Judiciary Act of 1789 rather than the Suspension Clause. 
See supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text. Further, as shall be seen, the 
citation to Story's treatise also has a weakness because the treatise itself pro-
vides no authority for its proposition. See infra notes 201-05 and accompa-
nying text. 
200. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
201. As with case law, modem treatises are of less value. See supra note 121 and 
accompanying text. 
202. 17 F. Cas. 144, 151-52 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
203. Id.; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (Cambridge, Brown, Shattuck, & Co. 1833). 
204. Id. 
205. See BINNEY, supra note 77, at 39 (stating that the last sentence of the entry 
does "something more than to beg the question. It demands or extorts 
it."). As with the discussion of justice Marshall's comments in Bollman, 
those commentators who agreed with Taney's results argued that, even 
though Story provided little authority for his position, his word was enough. 
See BULLITT, supra note 77, at 26 (stating that Story's opinion was one ren-
dered by a "most distinguished judge, given at a time when [he was] cer-
tainly free from any political bias"); WHARTON, supra note 81, at 19 (stating 
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Several other legal treatises of the time also placed the power of 
suspension in the hands of Congress.206 However, only the treatise by 
Rollin C. Hurd contains any analysis of the issue.207 Hurd placed the 
suspension power in Congress on the theory that "[r]ebellion and in-
vasion are eminently matters of national concern; and charged as 
Congress is, with the duty of preserving the United States from both 
these evils, it is fit that it should possess the power to make effectual 
such measures as it may deem expedient to adopt for their 
suppression. "208 
Thus, although the legal authorities in existence at the time of Mer-
ryman may have some persuasive value, they ultimately do not grant a 
conclusive answer. Therefore, it is necessary to explore other meth-
ods of interpreting the Constitution, such as analyzing its structure 
and the intent of the Framers. 
One clue resides in the structure of the Constitution. The Suspen-
sion Clause is contained in Article I, which concerns the powers of 
Congress, rather than Article II, which concerns the executive pow-
ers.209 Some have argued that this placement is an indication that the 
power to suspend is reserved to Congress.210 
Horace Binney contended, however, that the position of the Clause 
within the Constitution "is not of the least importance."211 He argued 
that, if the position of a clause carries meaning, the original place-
ment of the Suspension Clause in the Article concerning the powers 
of the judiciary would have made the suspension of the writ a judicial 
act, rather than a legislative one. 212 Binney argued that because such 
an assignment would not make sense, the placement of the Suspen-
sion Clause really had no meaning at all.213 
A review of the history of the Suspension Clause demonstrates the 
force, and ultimately the limitations, of Binney's argument. The Sus-
pension Clause was introduced at the Constitutional Convention as 










that it could be said of both Marshall and Story that "his opinion on a 
constitutional question is itself an argument"). 
See JOHNSTON, supra note 77, at 46-47 (citing treatises by William Rawle, 
Henry St. George Tucker, Theodore Sedgwick, George Ticknor Curtis, and 
Rollin C. Hurd). 
See id. at 47. 
HURD, supra note 139, at 116. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CaNsT. art. II. 
See Ex parle Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) 
(noting that the article in which the Suspension Clause is located "is de-
voted to the legislative department of the United States, and has not the 
slightest reference to the executive department"); see also BULLITT, supra 
note 77, at 18-19; JACKSON, supra note 77, at 2. 
BINNEY, supra note 77, at 32. 
Id. at 32-33. 
Id. 
See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 595, 598-99 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966). 
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ney's sixth article concerned powers of the legislature, and the lan-
guage pertaining to habeas corpus was part of a clause providing: 
The United States shall not grant any title of Nobility - -The 
Legislature of the United States shall pass no Law on the sub-
ject of Religion, nor touching or abridging the Liberty of the 
Press nor shall the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
ever be suspended except in case of Rebellion or Invasion.215 
Ultimately, however, resolutions derived from Edmund Randolph's 
"Virginia Plan," rather than Pinckney's proposal, were the suggestions 
sent by the Convention to the Committee of Detail for further 
work.216 The draft of the Constitution that emerged from the Com-
mittee of Detail on August 6, 1787, contained no provision regarding 
the writ of habeas corpus.217 
Pinckney again brought up the subject of habeas corpus on August 
20, when he submitted a proposition that stated: "The privileges and 
benefit of the Writ of Habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this Govern-
ment in the most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be 
suspended by the Legislature except upon the most urgent and press-
ing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding _ months.,,218 
The proposal was referred to the Committee of Detail for considera-
tion.219 From this proposal, it is clear that Pinckney, at least, intended 
the power of the suspension of habeas corpus to be exercised by 
Congress. 
On August 28, the Committee of Detail made its report.220 The 
Committee proposed to add Pinckney's idea to the eleventh article of 
the Constitution, which concerned the powers of the judiciary, and 
further proposed that the language read: "The privilege of the writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended; unless where in cases of rebel-
lion or invasion the public safety may require it."221 There was some 
215. Id. at 599. 
216. See Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Un-
derstanding, 81 YALE LJ. 672, 678-79 (1972). The Committee of Detail was 
appointed to write a draft of the Constitution conforming to what the dele-
gation had decided up to that point. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 178797, 128 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND'S 
REcORDs]. The Virginia Plan, although submitted by Randolph, was based 
on a draft submitted by James Madison. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 26 (1976). It would 
form the basis for much debate at the Convention. See JACK N. RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 59 (1996). 
217. BULLITT, supra note 77, at 12. 
218. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 216, at 340-41. 
219. Id. Another committee was appointed to "revise the style of and arrange 
the articles" that were agreed to by the Convention. Id. at 547. 
220. Id. at 434. 
221. Id. at 435. 
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discussion over this provision.222 Pinckney argued that, in order to 
secure the benefit of the writ "in the most ample manner," it should 
only be suspended "on the most urgent occasions," and even then for 
a time not to exceed twelve months.223 John Rutlidge, also from 
South Carolina, argued that the writ should be inviolate and did not 
"conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary at the same time 
through all the States."224 Governor Morris of Pennsylvania moved 
that the Committee's language be adopted.225 James Wilson, also of 
Pennsylvania, doubted whether a suspension could ever be necessary, 
given the discretion of judges to keep persons in jailor to grant 
bai1.226 The first part of the proposal, which stated that "[t]he privi-
lege ... shall not be suspended," passed unanimously.227 The second 
part, however, including the language "unless where in cases of rebel-
lion or invasion the public safety may require it," was passed on a vote 
of seven to three, with North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia 
voting against it.228 
At this point in the framing, the Suspension Clause was in the same 
form that it is in today.229 However, it was found in a section concern-
ing the power of the judiciary.230 Binney seized upon this placement, 
and the fact that the Committee of Detail had removed Pinckney's 
language regarding the legislature, as support for his argument.231 
He contended that, by placing the Suspension Clause in the judiciary 
article, the Framers intended suspension to be a judicial act, and not 
one requiring an enactment of the legislature.232 He further con-
tended that Morris's proposal to adopt the Committee's language 
"struck out" Pinckney's language concerning the legislature, showing 
that the Framers did not intend for Congress to be the branch to 
wield the power of suspension.233 
However, Binney's theory is problematic. First, while the Commit-
tee of Detail's version does not incorporate the language of Pinck-
ney's proposal from August 20, it does closely track the language of 
Pinckney's original draft Constitution.234 As shown by his later propo-






228. Id. Because the votes were recorded by state, it is impossible to determine 
whether Pinckney voted for or against the language in the second part. Id. 
229. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
230. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
231. BINNEY, supra note 77, at 26-27. 
232. Id. at 26. 
233. Id. at 27. 
234. See text accompanying supra note 215; BULLITT, supra note 77, at 15. As 
noted by Bullitt, the only substantial change made to Pinckney's proposal 
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sal, Pinckney believed the legislature should,be the branch to suspend 
the writ.235 
Further, Binney's theory requires the assumption that Morris's in-
tent was to change the branch that would exercise the suspension 
power by supporting language that did not include reference to the 
legislature. However, the final action on the Suspension Clause belies 
this assumption. On September 8, a Committee of Style was ap-
pointed to "revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to" by 
the Convention.236 Morris performed the majority of the work in that 
committee.237 The Committee of Style presented a version of the 
Constitution with the Suspension Clause in its current position in Arti-
cle p38 It seems highly unlikely that Morris attempted to strike out 
the term "legislature" in Pinckney's proposal in order to place the sus-
pending power in the hands of the executive or the judiciary, only to 
then move the Suspension Clause into the article concerning the pow-
ers of Congress.239 Binney posits that Morris might have included it 
there because it is a restrictive clause, as are the others in the ninth 
section of Article I.240 A far more reasonable inference, however, is 
that the Framers all along intended for Congress to hold the suspen-
sion power. 
Another indication exists in the text and structure of the Constitu-
tion that the Framers' intention was to vest the suspension power in 
Congress. While the Suspension Clause itself does not identify the 
branch which is to suspend, the first clause of section nine restricts 
Congress explicitly, stating: "The Migration or Importation of such 
was the addition of the restriction that public safety requires suspension. 
Id. 
235. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
236. See BINNEY, supra note 77, at 26; 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 216, at 
547. 
237. See MAx FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 181 (1913). In fact, there were strong suspicions that Morris used 
his position on the committee to subtly alter the meaning of some provi-
sions in the Constitution under the guise of polishing them. Id. at 181-83. 
Such suspicions were no doubt aided by Morris himself. See id. at 182. In 
fact, in a letter to Timothy Pickering, Morris stated that "[the Constitution] 
was written by the fingers which write this letter." Letter of Gouverneur 
Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEV-
ERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
506, 507 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 
1836) [hereinafter 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. However, James Madison also 
credited Morris with "[t]he finish given to the style and arrangement of the 
Constitution." Letter of James Madison to Mr. Sparks (Apr. 8, 1831), in 1 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 507. Other members of the Committee of Style 
were Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King, and William Johnson. 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 216, at 547. 
238. Id. at 596. 
239. See BULLIT, supra note 77, at 17-18. 
240. See BINNEY, supra note 77, at 33. 
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Persons shall not be prohibited by the Congress."241 The third 
clause implicitly references Congress, stating: "No Bill of Attainder or 
ex post facto Law shall be passed."242 There is no question that the 
third clause refers to Congress, as it is the only body that passes laws. 
However, if the Suspension Clause was not intended to apply to Con-
gress, then the third clause should contain an explicit reference to 
Congress, as does the first clause.243 The same is true for the rest of 
the clauses in section nine, all of which, except for the eighth clause, 
restrict powers of Congress.244 The eighth clause prohibits the 
"United States" from granting titles of nobility and prohibits any per-
son holding office from accepting "any present, Emolument, Office, 
or Title" from "any King, Prince, or foreign State" without the consent 
of Congress.245 The clause makes clear that it applies to officers other 
than those in Congress by stating that" [nl 0 title of Nobility shall be 
granted by the United States."246 The phrase "by the United States" 
would not be necessary unless the previous clauses referred only to 
the powers of Congress.247 
There is one final structural argument that some have made regard-
ing the Suspension Clause itself. Chief Justice Taney assumed in his 
Merryman opinion-and Binney asserted in his pamphlet-that the 
Suspension Clause is elliptical, in that its restriction on suspension of 
the privilege, except in certain circumstances, contains an implicit 
grant of authority to suspend in those circumstances.248 Many other 
pro-Congress commentators argue, however, that the Suspension 
Clause is not elliptical, but merely restricts the power to suspend, 
which is given to Congress elsewhere in the Constitution.249 Such a 










U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. l. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
See BULLITT, supra note 81, at 18-19 (noting that the Suspension Clause is 
"wedged in between two clauses which hold it fast and control it" and that, 
"as [the third clause] is confessedly ... a restriction upon Congress, but 
without again introducing the word Congress, it necessarily relates back to 
the first clause of the section and through the Habeas Corpus clause"). 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4-8. The fourth clause of section nine prohib-
its direct taxes unless in proportion to the population; the fifth clause pro-
hibits taxing of exports; the sixth clause prohibits favoritism of any state in 
commerce; and the seventh clause prohibits drawing money from the Trea-
sury except by lawful appropriation. Id. None of these clauses explicitly 
refers to Congress. Id. 
U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
See id. 
See ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) 
(stating that" [t] he clause of the constitution, which authorizes the suspen-
sion of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is in the 9th section of the 
first article"); BINNEY, supra note 77, at 11. 
See BROWN, supra note 77 at 14-15; BULLITT, supra note 77, at 9-1O;]ACKSON, 
supra note 77, at 7; PARKER, supra note 77, at 26-27; WHARTON, supra note 
77, at 16. 
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to suspend resides in Congress. However, these commentators are un-
able to agree as to where in the Constitution this power is vested.250 
One possible place for Congress to obtain the power to suspend is 
through its power to regulate the federal courts.251 Some evidence 
exists in favor of this theory, as one of the Constitutional Convention 
delegates, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, asserted this reasoning at 
the Virginia ratification convention.252 In responding to a question as 
to how Congress could suspend habeas corpus when the Constitution 
did not explicitly reserve to Congress the power to do so, Randolph 
stated, "I contend that, by virtue of the power given to Congress to 
regulate courts, they could suspend the writ of habeas CorpUS."253 
This theory, however, suffers from the same flaws as Chief Justice 
Taney's reliance on Ex parte Bollman.254 While Congress has the ability 
to pass legislation restricting federal courts from granting writs of 
habeas corpus, such legislation would not prevent the state courts 
from granting writs, thus rendering the exercise ineffective.255 
Other grants of power to Congress that might imply the power to 
suspend the privilege of the writ also present difficulties. Congress 
has the undisputed power to "declare War, grant Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and 
Water."256 However, even the most generous interpretation of this 
power gives Congress only the power to authorize war or other mili-
tary action, while leaving to the President the authority to conduct the 
same as Commander in Chief.257 The same problem occurs under 









See BROWN, supra note 77 at 14-15; BULLITT, supra note 77, at 9-10; JACKSON, 
supra note 77, at 7; PARKER, supra note 77, at 26-27; WHARTON, supra note 
77, at 16. Jackson and Nicholas believe that Congress has the power to 
suspend the privilege of the writ through the power to regulate the courts. 
NICHOLAS, supra note 77; JACKSON, supra note 77, at 7. Brown, Bullitt, and 
Wharton place the power to suspend in Congress's power "[t]o provide for 
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insur-
rections and repel Invasions." BROWN, supra note 77, at 13; BULLITT, supra 
note 77, at 9-10; WHARTON, supra note 77, at 16. Parker, however, believed 
that Congress had the authority to suspend the writ as the result of its war 
power. PARKER, supra note 77, at 27. 
See JACKSON, supra note 77, at 7. 
See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 464 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadeiphia,J.B. Lip-
pincott Co., 2d ed. 1836). 
Id. See also NICHOLAS, supra note 77. 
See supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text. 
See BULLITT, supra note 77, at 10. Binney also argues that Congress may not 
have the authority to withhold this power from the courts under the guise 
of regulating their jurisdiction. See BINNEY 2, supra note Ill, at 9-15. For an 
explanation of the presumed power of state courts to grant writs for federal 
prisoners, see supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 11. 
See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LES-
SONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3-5 (1993) (advocating an extremely 
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the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."258 
While Congress may authorize the calling out of the militia, the Presi-
dent uses the militia to conduct the actual suppression.259 
The records of the ratification debates cast little light on whether 
the Suspension Clause is elliptical. Very little was said regarding the 
Suspension Clause during the ratification debates, and what was said 
was conflicting.26o In opposition to the argument that it was not ellip-
tical, but rather an incidence of Congress's control over federal 
courts, Luther Martin, a Constitutional Convention delegate from Ma-
ryland, declared that the Suspension Clause gave to the "general gov-
ernment" the "power of suspending the habeas corpus act."261 
Based on this sparse evidence, it cannot be definitively said whether 
the Suspension Clause is elliptical. It can be said that it is possibly ellip-
tical, so the argument that the power to suspend habeas corpus is 
found in some other grant of authority to Congress is not, therefore, 
entirely persuasive. 
No matter what the conclusion with regard to the elliptical charac-
ter of the Suspension Clause, however, the overall weight of the evi-
dence regarding the proper placement of the suspending power 
appears to be clear. From the structure of the Constitution and the 
history of the Suspension Clause, it appears that the Framers intended 
for Congress to be the body charged with suspending the privilege of 
the writ of habeas cOrpUS.262 This theory is further supported by the 
records of the state ratification debates.263 While the debates do not 
make clear where the power to suspend the writ was placed, all of the 
broad interpretation of Congressional war powers, but recognizing that the 
President still commands the forces once authorized to do so). 
258. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 15. 
259. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, d. 1 (providing that the President is "Com-
mander in Chief ... of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States"). Reverdy Johnson also used this argu-
ment in his support of Lincoln's position. See STEINER, LIFE OF JOHNSON, 
supra note 63, at 51. Johnson essentially argued that, because the conduct 
of the war was entrusted to the President, the President was obliged to use 
every available means to suppress the rebellion, including the suspension of 
habeas corpus. See id. 
260. See, e.g., 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 237, at 375. 
261. [d. Martin stated that his fear that the suspension power might be used as a 
tool of oppression convinced him to vote against the clause. [d. 
262. See supra notes 110-261 and accompanying text. 
263. See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 108 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia,].B. Lip-
pincott Co., 2d ed. 1836) (providing Judge Dana's statement to the Massa-
chusetts Convention characterizing the Suspension Clause as a restriction 
on Congress); see also id. at 108-09 (Judge Sumner's statement to the same 
effect); 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 237, at 328 (discussing the New York 
Convention's declaration that "every person restrained of his liberty is enti-
tled to an inquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint ... except when, on 
account of public danger, the Congress shall suspend the privilege of the 
writ of habeas cmpus"). 
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available evidence suggests that it was widely assumed to be placed in 
Congress.264 
Such an assertion is consistent with the practice existing in the fed-
eral government in the period after ratification, while the Framers 
were still alive. The practice at that time provides valuable inferential 
evidence because, if the government had strayed too far from the con-
ceptions of the Framers, they would have been around to say SO.265 
For example, in 1807, while many of the Framers were still alive, Presi-
dent Thomas Jefferson requested that Congress authorize the suspen-
sion of the writ of habeas corpus to prevent Bollman and his co-
defendant from securing release. 266 Although a bill to do so passed 
the Senate, it was defeated in the House of Representatives.267 
Throughout the proceedings, there was no suggestion that the Presi-
dent had any authority to suspend the writ on his own, or that Con-
gress was not the proper body to do SO.268 
Finally, a decision by the Framers to place the suspension power 
with Congress would have been consistent with English practice, as 
well as that of state constitutions at the time of the framing. 269 En-
glish law gave Parliament the power to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus.270 Similarly, state constitutions vested the suspension power 
in their legislatures rather than their executives.271 
264. See supra note 261. 
265. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (noting that "the prece-
dential value of [early classifications of power] tends to increase in propor-
tion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787"); ELY, supra note 257, at 
9-10 (noting that the classification of powers by early Presidents and Con-
gresses is helpful to courts). 
266. DUKER, supra note 77, at 135. 
267. See id. at 136-37. Meanwhile, Bollman and Swarthout secured a writ of 
habeas corpus. Id. at 137. Before the return of the writ, the Government 
moved to bring them before the circuit court. Id. The court issued a 
bench warrant and, after a hearing, found sufficient evidence to commit 
them. Id. 
268. See id. at 135-37. 
269. See GROSS, supra note 77, at 11-20 (noting conformity with English law); 
JACKSON, supra note 77, at 6 (noting conformity with state constitutions); 
WHARTON, supra note 81, at 6-8 (noting conformity with both English law 
and state constitutions). 
270. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 136 (stating that 
the happiness of our constitution is, that it is not left to the execu-
tive power to determine when the danger of the state is so great as 
to render this measure expedient: for It is the parliament only, or 
legislative power, that, whenever it sees proper, can authorize the 
crown, by suspending the habeas corpus act for a short and limited 
time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for 
so doing. 
Taney quoted Blackstone in ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 144 (C.C.D. 
Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
271. See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1632, art. VII, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAws 1687 
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. V, reprinted in 
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In his supporting pamphlet, Binney attempted to minimize the im-
portance of any analogy to English law.272 He argued that the power 
granted under the Suspension Clause is different than that granted to 
Parliament, in that Parliament has unlimited power to suspend the 
writ whenever it wishes.273 He further argued that the motive behind 
giving the power to Parliament in England was jealousy of the King's 
power, and contended that the Framers had no such reason to be 
jealous of the power of the President, as that office was given only 
limited powers.274 
The first of Binney's arguments has some weight. The Framers evi-
denced intent to abandon English practices in some instances, includ-
ing the division of powers.275 However, there is no indication that the 
Framers intended to change the British system with regard to the sus-' 
pension of the writ of habeas corpus, except insofar as they desired to 
limit the use of the power to suspend. Furthermore, Binney's state-
ment that the Framers did not have the same jealousy towards the 
President as Parliament had towards the King because the President's 
powers were weak is almost nonsensical. The reason that the Framers 
made the President's powers weaker than those of the King of En-
gland appears to be precisely because of their jealousy of the Presi-
dent and fear of his having too much power.276 The Framers likely 
did not intend to increase the President's power by granting him the 
ability to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 
From an examination of the structure and history of the Constitu-
tion, it clearly appears that the power to suspend the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus found in the Suspension Clause is vested in Con-
gress.277 This conclusion is buttressed by the statements of the Fram-
ers during Ratification, the actions of the government during the early 
years of the Constitution, and the opinions of legal theorists on the 
subject.278 It is also consistent with the suspension of the writ in En-








5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAws 2787 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 5 CON-
STITUTIONS]; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 12, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra, at 3101; VT. CONST. of 1786, art. XVII, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAws 
3753 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (all providing that the suspension 
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See BINNEY, supra note 77, at 19-23. 
Id. at 19. 
Id. at 19-20. 
See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 65-66 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966) (discussing the statement of James Wilson that, with re-
gard to war, the powers of the British Monarch were not a proper guide for 
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the framing. 279 Justice Taney appears to have been correct in this re-
spect of his holding, although the matter is not as self-evident as he 
made it out to be.280 
III. THE QUESTION OF CONCURRENT PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
TO SUSPEND THROUGH NECESSITY, EMERGENCY, AND 
PRACTICALITY 
Some issues still exist that, although not addressed by Taney's opin-
ion in Merryman, are important in determining whether Lincoln's ac-
tions in the matter were lawful. The first of these is whether, even if 
the Constitution vests the power to suspend in Congress, there are 
some situations where military officials are justified in refusing to obey 
a writ of habeas corpus. Harvard Law Professor Joel Parker raised this 
question in connection with Merryman. 281 
Parker agreed with Taney's conclusion that, under the Suspension 
Clause, the proper body to suspend the writ is Congress, and did not 
argue that the President had the power to suspend.282 However, he 
contended that there are some circumstances that justifY the failure of 
military officers to obey writs of habeas corpus granted by courts. Ac-
cording to Parker, "war brings with it its own rules," and the duties of 
military commanders must be interpreted in light of those rules.283 
In stating his theory, Parker noted that 
[clearly,] the commander ofa column, thus marching to bat-
tle against insurgents, is not bound to encamp his men, and, 
in obedience to the command of a writ of habeas corpus, to 
repair forthwith to the court-house, wherever that may be, or 
to ajudge's chambers, if that be the place selected.284 
He then addressed the question of how far this proposition could ex-
tend.285 He arrived at the conclusion that a military officer may refuse 
to obey a writ of habeas corpus in cases where martial law is in effect, 
because martial law operates as a suspension of the writ. 286 
Parker then proceeded to the question of whether martial law was 
in operation at Fort McHenry, where Merryman was imprisoned.287 
279. See supra notes 269-76 and accompanying text. 
280. See ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148-52 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 
9,487). 
281. See PARKER, supra note 77, at 25. More recently, Martin S. Sheffer revisited 
the question. See Martin S. Sheffer, Presidential Power to Suspend Habeas 
Corpus: The Taney-Bates Dialogue and Ex Parte Merryman, 11 OKLA. CrIY U. 
L. REv. 1, 15 (1986). 
282. See PARKER, supra note 77, at 25-26. 
283. [d. at 10. 
284. [d. at 22. 
285. [d. at 23. 
286. [d. at 28-29. 
287. [d. at 346. 
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He concluded that, in time of war, troops are governed by martial law 
whether they: 
are in the face of the enemy, in battle array, or whether they 
are merely garrisoning a fort to aid thereby in suppressing a 
rebellion, or whether they are opening and holding the ave-
nues by which the passage of other troops to the theatre of 
active war is to be facilitated. 288 
As a result, according to Parker, General Cadwalader was not obli-
gated to obey Taney's writ. 289 
Parker's theory, however, is too inclusive. While it is true that an 
officer in the midst of or in preparation for battle would probably be 
justified in refusing to obey a writ of habeas corpus for a prisoner in 
his possession, such was not the situation at Fort McHenry. Rather, 
Fort McHenry was located in territory still, in a technical sense at least, 
loyal to the Union. The civil courts were still functioning, and there 
was no impediment to Merryman being brought before them and 
charged with treason, as he ultimately was.290 Under Parker's theory, 
any place where a prisoner was incarcerated by military force would 
have been a place under martial law, and by extension, no military 
prisoner could ever be released by writ of habeas corpus. Such an 
exception would swallow the Suspension Clause. 
A final issue to be addressed is whether, when Congress is not in 
session, the President may temporarily suspend habeas corpus in cases 
of rebellion or invasion. Lincoln himself brought up this issue in his 
address to the emergency session of Congress on July 5, 1861.291 Le-
gal historian William F. Duker has since refined this theory.292 The 
theory, as stated by Duker, is based on an analogy to the exception to 
Congress's war powers, which allows the President to repel sudden 
attacks.293 According to Duker, because the Framers realized that the 
President might be required to repel an attack without consulting 
Congress, and because the Framers granted the President the ability 
to exercise Congress's war powers in such a situation, the President 
should also be able to use Congress's power to suspend the privilege 
288. [d. at 40. 
289. See id. at 39. 
290. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
291. U.S. Senate Journal 37th Cong., 1st Sess., July 5, 1861, 12-13. 
292. See generally DUKER, supra note 77, at 14~5. Duker himself questions this 
theory, but believes that Taney should have at least considered it. See id. at 
148. 
293. [d. at 144. The original draft of the Constitution that emerged from the 
Committee of Detail gave Congress the power to "make" war. 2 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS, supra note 216, at 168. On the motion of James Madison and 
Elbridge Gerry, the Convention changed the word "make" to "declare" in 
order to give the President the ability to repel sudden attacks. [d. at 318-19. 
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of the writ of habeas corpus in the course of repelling such an 
attack.294 
This analogy, however, is problematic. The power to repel sudden 
attacks is an implied power carved out of Congress's power to make 
war. In repelling sudden attacks, the President does not, therefore, 
use Congress's war power, but instead uses his own. No such power 
has been carved out of the Suspension Clause. Instead, the Suspen-
sion Clause seems to contemplate situations such as a sudden attack 
because it allows Congress to suspend the privilege of the writ only in 
the direst of situations: in cases of invasion or rebellion when the pub-
lic safety requires it. If such situations are the same ones that would 
authorize the President to utilize the suspension power, then what 
good is vesting the power in Congress?295 Therefore, to claim that the 
President has the power to suspend habeas corpus under the power to 
repel sudden attacks is incorrect. 
Questions of practicality arise as a result of this constitutional analy-
sis. The idea that the President may not constitutionally suspend 
habeas corpus in an emergency has been criticized as a flaw in the 
Constitution that creates a danger to the country.296 Others have ar-
gued that constitutional analysis is futile as, in an emergency, the Pres-
ident will suspend the privilege of the writ if necessary, whether 
constitutionally authorized or not.297 
Harvard Law Professor Theophilus Parsons, another legal theorist 
in the Merryman debate, suggested a practical answer to these ques-
tions.298 Parsons argued that, although the power to suspend the priv-
ilege of the writ of habeas corpus was no doubt vested in Congress, 
this would not necessarily prohibit the President from using it in a 
sudden emergency.299 However, the President does so at his own risk, 
and is liable to Congress in an impeachment action if Congress feels 
that he has misused the power.300 Further, according to Parsons, the 
294. DUKER, supra note 77, at 144-45. 
295. In his treatise, Isaac Myer notes: "The Constitution of the United States was 
made for all time, and not as a creature of the moment; and the letters and 
writings of all contemporary statesmen show that rebellion and invasion 
were both contemplated, and that the Constitution was made for them, as 
well as for a state of tranquility and peace." MYER, supra note 77, at 30. See 
also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2663,2674 (2004) (Scalia,]., dissenting) 
(stating that "[w]hatever the general merits ofthe view that war silences law 
or modulates its voice, that view has no place in the interpretation and 
application of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in a 
manner that accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it"). 
296. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 36, at 484 (stating that "[t]he habeas corpus clause 
as now understood stands in the way of the government's protecting 
itself') . 
297. See, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 25; Sheffer, supra note 281, at 29. 
298. See MCPHERSON, supra note 77, at 162. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
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President is obliged to call Congress together as soon as might be ap-
propriate, and to be governed by their actions. 301 
Parson's theory has some benefits. It recognizes that the ultimate 
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is in Con-
gress, but allows the President the power to suspend the writ in emer-
gencies when Congress cannot be consulted. Attached to it is the 
proviso, however, that such a suspension is not constitutional and 
must be ratified by Congress. 
The theory also has some problems. In allowing the President to 
make the first move in suspending the writ, it lessens the incentive for 
Congress to make a decision. Instead of actively determining whether 
to suspend the privilege as it is constitutionally required to do, Con-
gress has an incentive to put off making a decision, and to authorize 
the President's actions if they ultimately prove to be popular, or pil-
lory the President if they prove to be unpopular. Further, if the sus-
pension is allowed to continue until Congress affirmatively acts to stop 
it, the whole focus of the power has changed to the detriment of indi-
vidual rights.302 It may be that Parson's theory is in line with actual 
practice, and that a determined President will exercise the power to 
suspend habeas corpus if necessary. However, such an exercise 
should not be legitimized as a correct interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF THE SUSPENSION POWER IN A POST 
9/11 WORLD 
The ultimate legal conclusion with respect to the power to suspend 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is that it is vested in Con-
gress, rather than the President. Further, there does not appear to be 
any means by which the President may lawfully suspend habeas corpus 
on his own, even in an emergency. That said, does this analysis have 
any relevance today? Long before 9/ 11, at least one legal theorist ex-
pressed skepticism, stating: 
It would seem ... futile to argue over the present location 
of [the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus], for it is a question on which fact and theory cannot 
be expected to concur. Today, as ninety years ago, the an-
swer to it is not to be found in law but in circumstance. The 
301. Id. 
302. This is essentially what occurred during the Civil War. See supra notes 83-86 
and accompanying text. Lincoln substantially followed Parsons's theory, in 
that he put the matter of suspension before the emergency session of Con-
gress on July 5, 1861. Supra note 83 and accompanying text. However, 
Congress took no action until March 3, 1863. See supra notes 83-85 and 
accompanying text. Congress would certainly have been more active if it 
were debating the President's request to suspend in the face of war, rather 
than simply deciding whether to ratify a decision already made. 
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one great precedent is what Lincoln did, not what Taney 
said.363 
However, the reason that Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus was 
successful was not because his argument was persuasive on the merits, 
or even because the general public thought it to be necessary. Rather, 
it succeeded in large part because of the failure or inability of the 
other branches to honor their constitutional obligations. Although 
Chief Justice Taney attempted to assert the power of the judicial 
branch, his attempt was undermined not only by his and the Supreme 
Court's loss of political capital following the Dred Scott decision, but 
also by the failure of the other members of the Court to support his 
ruling in Merryman. 304 More importantly, Congress acquiesced in Lin-
coln's suspension, first by making no attempt to either authorize or 
revoke it, and then by authorizing it almost two years after the fact. 305 
Absent the capitulation of these two branches on the issue, Lincoln's 
suspension of habeas corpus might not have held up. 
The lesson of Merryman, then, is less an affirmation of the power of 
the President to take whatever measures he deems necessary than it is 
an indictment of the inaction of Congress and the judiciary. The ar-
gument about which branch has the power to suspend habeas corpus 
sheds light on this "zone of twilight," and in doing so reminds each 
branch of its obligations and duties under the Constitution. Civil lib-
erties must sometimes be curtailed in the face of a national emer-
gency, and this fact is recognized and provided for by the 
Constitution. However, if in such times the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus is to be suspended, it must be done by Congress, not 
the President alone. Presidents must understand this as a limit to 
their power, and Congress must understand this as an obligation to 
ensure that it is the one to decide whether to suspend the privilege. 
Further, the relevance of the question of the power to suspend habeas 
corpus extends beyond the specific issue itself. In the time since the 
Civil War, habeas corpus has been suspended on only a few occasions 
in limited areas, and has always been based on authority delegated by 
Congress.306 However, Presidents have claimed other far-reaching 
powers through the years under the guise of emergency that have en-
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terror cases, the Bush Administration claimed that the President has 
the power to unilaterally designate American citizens as "enemy com-
batants," and to hold such citizens for the duration of the current 
amorphous "war on terror" without court review. 308 Such a power, 
had the Court determined it to exist, would have rendered the Sus-
pension Clause unnecessary. Thus, the answer to the question of the 
power to suspend habeas corpus informs our understanding of the 
Constitution's provisions for times of emergency and the extent of the 
emergency powers that Congress and the President possess. The es-
tablishment of constitutional boundaries to these powers is vitally im-
portant if our rights as citizens are to be protected. 
CONCLUSION 
As the events of Merryman recede ever farther into the mists of time, 
and analysis of the case becomes more historical than legal, it is still 
important to remember that the power of the office of the President 
has its limits, and that the Congress and the judiciary must exercise 
their powers and obligations. It is by exploring those limits, powers, 
and obligations that the public gains knowledge of them, and the 
branches of government are reminded of them. Lincoln's suspension 
of habeas corpus succeeded because Congress, and to a lesser extent, 
the judiciary, abrogated its responsibilities. While there is an argu-
ment that the suspension of habeas corpus was necessary, the argu-
ment that the "ends justifies the means" is a dangerous one on which 
to rely. If our personal liberties are to remain intact, it is incumbent 
upon all of us to require that the Congress, the President, and the 
courts recognize and adhere to the constitutional limitations on their 
power, and not sacrifice liberty on the altar of fear and expediency. 
Merryman thus serves as an important reminder of this duty. 
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